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1
Introduction
For forty years now, conflict and tensions in the occupied territories of
Palestine have made for a lifestyle filled with hardships and uncertainty for the
Palestinian people. Despite facing the daily reality and humiliation of occupation,
they continue to struggle and to hope that the world will recognize the rights of
the Palestinians to have their own state and to live in peace, free from occupation.
Unfortunately, despite the tremendous perseverance and fortitude demonstrated
by the Palestinians, no real progress has been made in years of conflict, and
numerous attempts at peace agreements and negotiations have failed.
The failings and corruption of the government dominated by Fatah have
become notorious and have plagued the progress of Palestinians for decades. As
Fatah became increasingly ineffective, an alternative movement, Hamas, became
stronger, providing social welfare to the people and proving themselves to be
legitimate in their concern for the Palestinians. With the death of Fatah’s leader,
Yasser Arafat, in 2004, his successor, Mahmud Abbas, called for elections to
create more legitimacy within the Palestinian government. Despite being an
opposition movement, Hamas decided to participate in the elections with an
outcome that shocked the world – they won.
On January 25, 2006, the Palestinians voted Hamas into power. While
Hamas had hoped to do well, most within the group never believed they would
actually take control of the government. Some members of the international
community, namely Western countries, did not believe it either, and promptly
responded with economic boycotts of the “terrorist”-led government. At the same
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time, Fatah refused to join Hamas in a coalition government, foreshadowing what
would manifest into incredible tensions, leading to fears about civil war. Amidst
international discontent and domestic tension, Hamas took over the government
and tried to focus on domestic issues, such as building institutions and restoring
security and order. However, the economic boycott violently shoved Hamas into
dealing with the international discontent as well as domestic impoverishment that
was being exacerbated by the lack of funding. Even in the US, presidents who
have tried to pursue “guns and butter” have failed. Thus, it is easy to see how the
cards were quickly being stacked against Hamas.
Currently, more than a year after Hamas was elected, they still have
refused to give into the demands of the West, which keeps the economic boycott
in place. However, Hamas leaders have made statements that are promising and
demonstrate a willingness to compromise. They have also essentially agreed to
the conditions put forth by the boycotting nations, in variation. Furthermore,
Hamas has just recently signed an agreement to create a unity government with
Fatah. With multiple challenges both at home and abroad staring Hamas in the
face, they have showed unity and strength. The rhetoric being used by leaders is
much different than from years past, and it seems quite obvious that Hamas has
been making changes. However, this may not be good enough for the West.
Consequently, it is difficult to know for sure how effective the Hamas
leadership could be because of the remarkable constraints the government is
facing due to the economic boycott. Nevertheless, there is evidence that leads one
to believe that Hamas could have a positive impact on the lives of Palestinians,
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given a fair chance to govern their people. Additionally, if the United States and
Israel could get past labels of terrorist and would negotiate fairly with Hamas, the
results could be monumental.
This thesis will discuss the impact of the 2006 elections for Palestinians
specifically, and the Israel-Palestine conflict more broadly. However, before
considering the ramifications of the elections, a discussion of Hamas’s origins,
beliefs, and support base will be presented in order to understand who Hamas is,
why the movement has come to power, and what they could be capable of
achieving. After analyzing this background information, in conjunction with what
has happened thus far as a result of the elections, I will discuss how Hamas is not
the real barrier to peace. Furthermore, I propose that the election of Hamas,
despite its being a terrorist group, could be a positive development given the right
international support. Finally, I will suggest changes in policy that should be
made by all parties involved.

The Palestinian Situation
The Land of Palestine: A Brief Historical Overview
The historical land that was Palestine consists of present-day Israel, the
West Bank, Gaza, parts of Jordan and southern Lebanon. After WWI and the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Britain took control of Palestine in what is
known as the British Mandate. Through various agreements and declarations, the
British government respected the desire of the Jewish people to create their own
nation in Palestine. As more and more Jewish settlers moved into the region, the

4
Arab population started to become more apprehensive. Once Britain gave up its
mandate in 1948, the Jewish population immediately declared the state of Israel.
Armed conflict broke out and other Arab nations intervened, resulting in Egypt’s
control of Gaza and Jordan’s control of the West Bank. Then, in 1967 tensions
arose again, this time regarding diverting water supplies. Eventually, another war
started in June, resulting in a devastating defeat for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
Since then, the West Bank and Gaza have been occupied by Israel (The Middle
East 2005).

Living Under Occupation
As will be explored in a future section of the paper, the social programs
that Hamas operates have helped them garner support for the movement because
of the extreme poverty in the occupied territories. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
examine the living conditions in the occupied territories to understand how the
situation shapes the views and actions of the Palestinians.
Humanitarian concerns have been an issue almost as long as the conflict
between Israel and Palestine has existed; however, since the election of Hamas,
the problem has become markedly worse. The UN Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) announced in a report that humanitarian conditions
have witnessed a “sharp deterioration” since the elections because of Israel’s
security measures (Humanitarian…2006). The report elaborates on and discusses
the adverse affects of the checkpoints and barrier. Among other concerns, the
report cites denying people access to their land, seizing land as “State Land” after
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it is not farmed or occupied for three years, granting less travel permits, and
closing more access gates (Humanitarian…2006). Even without the economic
boycott, which obviously has exacerbated all of the other economic problems
facing the Palestinians, the situation in the territories has been one of the most
dismal in the world due to measures such as the separation barrier and endless
checkpoints.
The checkpoints and travel restrictions have been part of Israel’s defense
plan since the start of the 2000 intifada; however, both have become stricter and
more prevalent in recent years. Currently, 542 obstacles have effectively carved
the West Bank into three regions (Myre 2006). Travel between these regions has
become extremely limited and time-consuming. Beyond these 542 official
checkpoints and barriers, hundreds of other obstacles such as earth mounds,
concrete blocks, and trenches cut off roads and cause obstructions that add to
travel time and woes (Myre 2006). Furthermore, the diversions and obstacles
were strategically placed and have basically created a system of separate
Palestinian roads and Israeli roads (Humanitarian…2006).
At the checkpoints, Palestinians wait outside of checkpoints for hours to
pass through turnstiles, metal detectors and interrogation from Israeli soldiers, in
hopes of being allowed to continue towards their destination. Almost all of the
people who are denied passage are dismissed for arbitrary reasons. Some days all
men under a specific age are turned away, other days students are targeted, and on
occasion nobody is let through. Even Israeli soldiers manning the checkpoints
find the situation hard to cope with. Staff Sgt. Sergey Zamensky, who worked at
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the checkpoints, discusses the emotional pains that the soldiers endure when they
must turn away students who will miss their finals, grandmothers trying to visit
their grandchildren, and even a young bride who would miss her own wedding
(Moore 2004). "Every day, the regulations were different," Zamensky said. "One
day, you can let everyone pass; on another, no one is able to come in. It's very
difficult to explain” (Ibid). Adding to the frustration, most of the Israeli soldiers
only know a few words of Arabic (Ibid). Unfortunately, according to Israeli Sgt.
Nadav Efrati, “the main words they taught us were: 'Stop. If not, I will shoot
you’” (Ibid). Thus, communication between the Palestinians and Israelis is
strained and limited, adding to the tensions and hostilities on both sides.
The checkpoints affect more than just personal relations and study. Many
people are unable to go to their jobs or arrive late even if they are allowed to pass
through the checkpoints. As a result of the restricted movement of both
employees and consumers, the economy of the occupied territories has been
adversely affected. Estimates from the World Bank state that the potential size of
the Palestinian economy has been reduced by five percent because of the
restrictions placed on the movement of people and goods (Myre 2006). The
checkpoints seem to serve no actual purpose other than to further humiliate and
inconvenience the Palestinians. The Israeli government claims that the
checkpoints are for security measures; however, the Palestinians are not trying to
travel into Israel, but within the Palestinian territories themselves. Even though
Jewish settlers live in the West Bank, in accordance with UN Resolution 242, the
Israelis should have withdrawn from the area already. Therefore, if Israel would
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withdraw its settlements then the checkpoints would not be necessary.
Nevertheless, the current situation of limited movement and barricaded enclaves
of Palestinian areas and Israeli areas is becoming increasingly similar to the
apartheid government of South Africa.
The second strategy that the Israeli government has utilized for alleged
security reasons is the building of the separation barrier. The idea of building a
barrier first emerged in 1967 when the Israelis thought it would be beneficial to
build something along their borders to separate the Palestinian territories and
Israel. Initially, the barrier was to follow the “green line,” which had been staked
out by the United Nations in order to separate Palestine and Israel (The
Wall…2003). However, building of the separation barrier did not start until June
2002 (Graham 2002). The barrier consists of reinforced concrete, barbed wires,
and electronic security among other materials. Once construction on the barrier
started, claims were instantly made about the legality of the barrier (The
Wall…2003). The route of the wall did not follow the 1967 borders and in some
places actually split towns in two. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled
that the barrier was illegal and that Israel should stop construction, take down
what they had built, and provide reparations to the Palestinians whose property
they had destroyed in the process of building the wall (Legal…2004). The ruling
also stated that the wall did serve as a de facto annexation of territory (Ibid). In
regards to humanitarian concerns, the ICJ addressed the ramifications of the
barrier and stated that it would create problems for agriculture, health services,
access to education, and access to water among many other concerns (Ibid). Even
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the Israeli Supreme Court, the High Court of Justice (HCJ), ruled that the route of
the barrier should be changed to take humanitarian concerns into account
(Judgment…2004). Still, the barrier remains under construction and the Israeli
government continues to ignore the rulings of the ICJ, mainly because the United
States opposes any action that the UN tries to take in order to enforce this ruling.
The excruciating experience of living under occupation and the
ramifications of such a life could never be fully conveyed through words.
However, besides dealing with physical barriers and checkpoints, the Palestinians
must bear countless burdens, among them: not having their own state, living in
immense poverty and humiliating circumstances, and abandonment by the
international community which seems to be indifferent or unwilling to help them
or to address their plight. The poverty rates in the territories are astounding. In the
West Bank 55% of Palestinians live below the poverty line of two dollars a day,
while 70% in Gaza live below the same line (Poverty…2007). Furthermore, the
number of unemployed Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza has
reached 63.3% and 50% respectively (Ibid). Under such harsh circumstances and
relative inaction by their own government, it is not that difficult to see why
Palestinians would vote for change, hope, and an organization that offered real
help through social programs-Hamas.
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The History of Hamas
The Origins and Founding of Hamas
Although Hamas was not established until 1987, the roots of Hamas date
back further to the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt to Palestine.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded in Egypt in 1945, was started by Islamic
fundamentalist Hasan al-Banna and called for the development of an Islamic
government (Andersen 63: 2004). Fundamentalism, historically, has been applied
to many religions and generally means a strict adherence to a literal interpretation
of a set of basic principles (Merriam-Webster 2007). As applied to Islam, Islamic
fundamentalists seek the “Islamization of the political order” (Tibi 1998).
However, various fundamentalists have their own interpretations of the Quran as
well as differing views on how the Islamization would best be achieved.
Nevertheless, as the MB grew in popularity, its following branched outside of
Egypt into other nations, among them Palestine. The first branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Palestine was established in 1945 in Jerusalem (Mishal 16: 2000).
Throughout the next twenty years, branches of the movement proliferated among
many Palestinian towns. However, while the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian
control in the late 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood suffered from times of
repression due to the MB’s acts against the Egyptian government (Mishal 17:
2000). The strict conditions in which the MB operated in Gaza eventually forced
the movement underground (Ibid). Consequently, the members in Gaza became
much more militant compared to their counterparts in the West Bank, who were
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under Jordanian control and relatively free to operate in the open (Mishal 18:
2000).
The MB’s popularity and message caught the attention of many
Palestinians, including the future founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.
Yassin became the MB’s leader in Gaza in 1968 and steered the movement
towards becoming more stable and institutionalized (Mishal 19: 2000). In 1973,
the Islamic Center (al-Mujamma al-islami) was founded in Gaza to coordinate
and develop religious and educational institutions in the area (Ibid). The activities
and structure of the Mujamma would become significant later as the framework
for Hamas. One aspect that Hamas carried on from the Mujamma was the
application of the Islamic principle of charity (zakat). The Mujamma utilized this
principle as the justification and compelling reason to start social programs
focusing on creating clinics, schools, youth programs, and the like (Mishal
20:2000).
Another component of the Mujamma’s strategy that Hamas also
duplicated was the use of mosques to spread its message and influence. The
number of mosques was significant enough to allow the message of the MB to be
heard by a vast proportion of society. Furthermore, mosques were viewed as the
perfect place to disseminate the MB’s message due to the fact that they were free
from intrusion by the Israelis (Mishal 21: 2000). Hamas also depends on the
mosques as one venue for spreading their message for these same reasons.
Beyond principles and strategies, the leadership structure of Hamas has
also been modeled upon the MB and the Mujamma. The Mujamma used ties to
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MB branches in other nations to raise funds for their programs (Mishal 22:2000).
Eventually, this would lead to the Hamas leadership being scattered across
countries, which will be discussed later.
Hamas was established in 1987 by Sheikh Yassin at the beginning of the
first intifada as the combatant arm of the MB. Hamas was supposed to be
independent from the MB and in 1988 took its first step towards truly becoming
its own organization by adopting the name Hamas (Mishal 35: 2000). Hamas, an
acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (The Islamic Resistance
Movement), also means “strength,” “bravery,” and “zeal” in Arabic (Herzog
2006). In August of 1988, the group created its charter and proclaimed itself a
“wing” of the MB in the first chapter (Mishal 35, 177: 2000). As a short term
goal, Hamas worked to drive the Israeli forces out of Palestine. However, in the
long run, Hamas seeks to establish an Islamic state which would include all of
historic Palestine, “from [Mediterranean] Sea to [Jordan] River” (Hamas leaflet
no.28 as quoted in Mishal 51:2000). Nevertheless, Hamas leaders appear to be
willing to modify this goal to achieve peace.
One of the main shifts evident in the establishment of Hamas was that the
focus moved from strictly reformist and community based to having a political
nature as well (Mishal 37: 2000). Furthermore, the movement also took on a
nationalist sentiment of fighting for Palestine, rather than an individual level as
was the case with the MB. Naturally, these ideological shifts became extremely
relevant as Hamas started to challenge Fatah, participate in local elections, and
eventually go on to win the national elections.
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The Structure and Organization of Hamas
Although Hamas has different types of operations, it does not have a direct
separation of its various wings. Both political and military operations are
organized under the same authority (Herzog 2006). However, there is a functional
division between the internal organization and the military units. Since Hamas,
along with Islamic Jihad, was labeled as a terrorist organization in June 1989 by
the Israeli government, the group had to take more precautions to prevent the
arrest or assassination of its leaders (Mishal 56: 2000). Thus, Hamas horizontally
separated its members so that the leadership would be more fragmented and
harder to trace (Ibid). Therefore, the group organized itself based on a vertical
hierarchy, meaning that each group of local activists reported to headquarters
abroad but had nothing to do with other groups of activists. As a result, the links
between the political, religious and military divisions became almost non-existent
except at the highest levels of authority. Consequently, the hierarchy of lower
level leaders across groups and the political/religious-military divide became
confused and difficult to decipher (Mishal 57:2000).
Another security measure that Hamas took was to recruit solely based
upon personal acquaintance (Mishal 56: 2000). This way, each new member had
somebody who vouched for them, making them a more credible candidate.
Furthermore, all communication was done indirectly through messages and
leaflets and supplies were left in safe places for someone else to pick up (Mishal
56: 2000). Usually, this sort of activity took place in or around the mosques, again

13
because of the safety from Israeli intrusion or intelligence. Finally, the nature of
the group also helped it to stay afloat despite Israeli oppression. Hamas is deeply
rooted in its social institutions; therefore, more activists continuously express
desire to join the group and the network of social programs and mosques provided
a venue for information swapping as discussed above.
As was alluded to earlier, the leadership structure of Hamas is split into
two groups: the “inside” leadership and the “outside” leadership. This division
refers to the leaders who live and operate from inside the occupied territories and
those that reside in other nations, such as Jordan or the US. To be clear, these
outside leaders are still Palestinian, but have either been forced to leave Palestine,
have moved voluntarily, or were raised in other countries by their Palestinian
parents. While the “inside” leadership, headed by Yassin, was originally more
influential in the movement, this changed in 1989 when most of the inside
leaders, including Yassin, were arrested (Mishal 58: 2000). The members of the
outside leadership consulted with each other and decided to send a group of the
outside leaders from the US, headed by Musa Abu Marzuq, to Gaza in order to
take over and reorganize the movement (Mishal 58: 2000). Once in Gaza, Marzuq
divided the West Bank into seven sub-districts and Gaza into five (Ibid). Each of
the sub-districts was then divided into separate headquarters based upon four
branches: security, religious indoctrination, political activity and coordination
(Ibid). Additionally, the leaders of each of the four branches constituted the
command for the sub-district (Ibid). Finally, the West Bank and Gaza were tied
together through a coordinating group made up of the higher leadership and
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partitioned into three committees: political, military, and indoctrination (Ibid).
This new restructuring marked the first time that the outside leadership gained
control of Hamas, which diminished the authority of inside leaders such as
Yassin. The control was now based upon Marzuq in the US and other leaders in
Jordan. However, the leadership shifted again once the United States labeled
Hamas a terrorist organization in 1993 causing the leadership to move to Jordan,
where it could operate relatively freely (Mishal 58: 2000).
Even after this reorganization, Hamas continued to face crackdowns on
the movement by Israeli forces. Therefore, the “battalions of ‘Izz al-Din alQassam” was started in 1991 by Walid ‘Aql (Mishal 64:2000). ‘Aql, a senior
member of Hamas, became the first commander of the battalion (Ibid). The group
soon became associated with assassinations and the use of car bombs (Mishal
65:2000). Part of the group’s success is owed to the man whose name the
organization bears. Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam was a predecessor to the Hamas
leaders and encouraged the masses to act without the direction of the elite (Nusse
95:1998). He also advocated that resistance was a “religious, and therefore a
moral and ethical duty (Ibid).” These ideals essentially became a main part of
Hamas’s ideology and helped Hamas establish themselves as a social, grass-roots
movement. Therefore, compared to the PLOs reputation as being out of touch
with the people, Hamas had tremendous appeal. Thus, by using Sheikh Qassam’s
name, the organization evoked feelings of the masses working together in the face
of abandonment by the elites and as a religious duty.
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The Ideology of Hamas
As a result of Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement is
an Islamist movement. Hamas’s charter states under its ideological origins that
“From Islam it derives its ideas and its fundamental precepts and view of life, the
universe, and humanity; and it judges all its actions according to Islam and is
inspired by Islam to correct its errors (Mishal 177: 2000).” While Hamas’s
religious foundation and its move towards violent means has lead many
governments to label it as a terrorist organization, Hamas is more flexible and
reasonable than its reputation would imply. Initially, Hamas was essentially a
social movement providing services and responding to the immediate needs of the
community (Mishal preface: 2000). Gradually, Hamas has incorporated political
aspects and goals into its agenda. Still, throughout its existence it has adapted to
and manipulated situations to remain true to its religious framework while
simultaneously making decisions and changes that allow the movement to stay
relevant.
Although Hamas does have religious and even fundamentalist inclinations,
it should not necessarily be viewed as an extremist group that is unwilling to
compromise. In many respects, Hamas has already moved away from traditional
fundamentalist thinkers. One example of this shift is Hamas’s use of nationalist
sentiment. Hamas often promotes its views and struggles in light of all
Palestinians fighting against the occupier, Israel. In order for these arguments to
be more palatable, the movement evokes feelings of nationalism to get all
Palestinians to unite. Even its relations with Fatah and the PLO have been shaped
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by Hamas’s unwillingness to enter conflict with fellow Palestinians and its desire
to preserve national unity. This sense of nationalism is in stark contrast to
fundamentalist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, who states that “Patriotism should
consist in bonds to the Faith, not to a piece of land” (Sivan 32: 1985). Clearly,
Hamas has deviated from the traditional view of nationalism held by
fundamentalist thinkers. Not only does this represent a willingness to adapt its
ideology, it also shows that Hamas does follow a strategic thought pattern as
nationalism is a logical way for Hamas to gain support.
When confronted with discussions about Hamas and other Islam-based
terrorist organizations, the notion of jihad will undoubtedly emerge. Some groups,
such as Al Qaeda, have interpreted jihad as an offensive movement. An offensive
jihad dictates that the “land of the infidels” should be attacked (Sageman 2:
2004). Conversely, Hamas advocates a defensive jihad. The ideology of Hamas
states that “it does not take action against anybody because of his thought or
religious convictions, as long as these are not transformed into perceptible
hostility towards and destruction of the rights of the Islamic Umma [community]”
(Nusse 37: 1998). However, in the case of Israel, the Israeli occupiers infringe
upon the rights of the Palestinians and are therefore considered by Hamas to be
“war enemies” (Ibid). Thus, while groups such as Al Qaeda will continue to target
whichever nations it views as hostile towards the creation of Islamic society or as
conspirators with such nations, Hamas only targets Israel with the immediate goal
of stopping the occupation.
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One of the ideological points that has caused Hamas to be at odds with the
PLO is the idea that the land of Palestine is a waqf, or Islamic endowment, which
is the property of “former, present and future generations” and, therefore, no
person or organization has the authority to give away or make compromises
regarding the land (Nusse 47: 1998). Obviously, as Hamas members believe in the
idea of Palestine as a waqf, they would be in conflict with the PLO who have
made concessions with the Israeli government and have adopted a strategy of a
two-state solution. While this difference has been significant in the relations
between the two organizations as well as for the ideology of Hamas, Hamas
seems more willing to compromise on this principle in recent years, which will be
addressed in more detail later.

Violence and Hamas
Hamas, while viewed as a terrorist organization in opposition to the PLO,
actually adopted the same stance towards armed struggle as the National Charter
of the PLO did in 1968, which stated that armed struggle is a “strategy and not a
tactic” (Mishal 50: 2000). During the first intifada, Hamas turned to violence as
its strategy in part because Islamic Jihad had already done so (Mishal 57:2000).
Hamas was worried that the group would lose support and legitimacy if it
continued to preach jihad but did not act. Thus, by invoking an armed struggle,
the movement gave real meaning to carrying out a jihad. While the violent means
employed by Hamas got progressively more severe, culminating in the use of
suicide bombers, it is important to note that the movement still considers violence
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to be a tactic. This distinction is important in that a tactic can change and will
generally be adapted to the current situation. Furthermore, Hamas leaders have
made promising statements regarding their violent tactics. Prominent Hamas
leader, Mahmur al-Zahar, stated that “If we can fulfill our goals without violence,
we will do so. Violence is a means, not a goal” (Mishal 71:2000). Thus, it is not
impossible that Hamas would at some point be willing to lessen or completely
refrain from the use of violence as their main strategy.
Furthermore, Hamas has also proven in the past that they are willing to
change their policies and to react to the reality that confronts them. During the
first intifada, Hamas originally advocated a policy of economic boycott of Israel.
However, many merchants and workers were either unable or unwilling to
participate in such a boycott due to economic considerations. Reacting to the
strife the boycott placed on Palestinians, Hamas re-evaluated their position and
adjusted their policy. Instead, they urged the boycotting of products from Israel
that had readily available substitutes and strikes for workers who were employed
only in sectors in direct competition with the territories (Mishal 63:2000). This
strategy not only garnered more support, but also showed the sensitivity of the
organization to the Palestinian people, something not always obvious with the
policies of the PLO.

The Popularity of Hamas
Initially, Hamas focused on da’wa, or religious preaching and education
(Mishal 19: 2000). Thus, from the onset, Hamas found receptive ears in the Gaza
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Strip especially. The conditions in Gaza were dismal, with the world’s highest
population density, half of which live in refugee camps (Mishal 19:2000).
Obviously, this group of people would be willing to listen to Hamas, who offered
an alternative and hope. The movement’s continued work with creating social
institutions and providing charity, such as providing financial and technical
support to rebuild a community after a severe storm, added to its popularity and
legitimacy as a group that fights for the people (Mishal 20:2000).
The movement’s support base was given a significant boost following
political developments outside of Hamas’s control. A culmination of frustration at
abandonment by other Arab nations, military defeats, and the PLOs shift to
becoming an international player lead many Palestinians to consider Hamas as an
alternative to the status quo. The PLO, Hamas’s main competition, had started
with an ideology similar to Hamas in respect to Israel and the creation of a
Palestinian state; however, as time wore on and as international pressure for peace
mounted, the PLO accepted a two-state solution with Israel (Mishal 14: 2000).
This reality disturbed some Palestinians who then turned to Hamas as
representative of their desire to fight for all of Palestine.
Internationally, the peace agreement reached between Egypt and Israel in
1978 had a large impact on regional politics and the formation of Hamas. Egypt
agreed to recognize Israel in return for the Israelis withdrawing their troops from
the Sinai Peninsula (Andersen 2004). Additionally, the second phase of the
accords was supposed to grant the Palestinians in the West Bank autonomy (Ibid).
However, nothing came of this second portion, leading to frustration for the
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Palestinians. Furthermore, the rest of the Arab nations joined with the Palestinians
in criticizing Egypt who, unsurprisingly, lost the respect of the Arab countries and
its position as a regional leader. For the Palestinians, this translated into another
strong party that was taken away from their struggle (Alkoni 2007). As it relates
to Hamas, this event added to a string of many more that would lead a desperate
population to support Hamas.
Another event that shifted the attention of the Arab world away from the
Palestinian cause was the Iran-Iraq War in 1981. As both Iran and Iraq supported
revolutionary fervor amidst the other’s minority populations, tensions between the
two nations escalated into a war that lasted seven years (Andersen 2004). The rest
of the Arab world watched intently and nervously, fearing that revolutionary
attitudes would reach their way to the minorities in their own nations (Ibid). Even
once the war ended, fears remained about an Islamic revolution in Iran and the
consequences it would have for other nations. Thus, the Arab world had little time
to contemplate the plight and fate of the Palestinians (Alkoni 2007).
Enhancing the perceived weakness of the PLO and the despair of the
Palestinians, in 1982 the PLO lost its base in Lebanon due to an Israeli invasion
(Mishal 14:2000). For many Palestinians this signaled the weakness of the PLO
and a sign that the PLO could not possibly be strong enough to push the Israeli
occupiers out of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians were ripe for a new
movement that could bring them hope. This event also spurred Sheikh Yassin to
start organizing for an armed struggle against Israel (Mishal 34: 2000).
Furthermore, the MB saw the PLO as losing its military and political clout and
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thought that this weakness might present the movement with an opportunity to
step in as an alternative. Eventually this shift culminated in the creation of Hamas.
Throughout the intifada, Hamas continued to increase the number and
scope of its social institutions, garnering more support along the way. Also, as the
PLO continued to be conciliatory in regards to the peace process, they began to
lose legitimacy which coupled with the well-known corrupt policies of the
organization (Mishal 89:2000). Conversely, Hamas remained credible as a
legitimate resistance movement of the people that was free of corruption.
Obviously, as the PLO lost support, Hamas gained support.
Exacerbating the situation for the PLO, the effects of the Gulf War took a
toll on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza (Mishal 89:2000). Consequently,
the PLO was not able to pay for welfare or salaries for many Palestinians (Ibid).
During this time, Hamas continued their social programs and stepped in to
provide the Palestinians with support and aid when the government could not do
so (Ibid). Naturally, this would make some Palestinians start to doubt the
efficiency of their government while simultaneously gaining more respect for
Hamas.
Another event out of Hamas’s control that worked in their favor was the
deportation of 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists. In 1992, the Israeli
government, reacting to the murder of an Israeli border patrol, deported 415
activists to Lebanon (Mishal 96: 2000). Among those expelled was a prominent
Hamas leader, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Ranitisi (Ibid). Internationally and within
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Palestine, the deportation was considered to be in violation of human rights and
instantly pushed people to rally behind Hamas.
Four main current events have also bolstered the strength of Hamas. First,
the Oslo Accords had an initially negative effect on Hamas, but then turned out to
function in their advantage. The Accords promised many things, including the end
of the occupation, and many Palestinians supported the process, hoping that it
would bring peace. However, it was an open-ended agreement which never
reached fruition. In fact, instead of ending the occupation, the size of the
settlements actually doubled in seven years after the Oslo process began (Shikaki
2007b). Consequently, the Palestinians became disillusioned and started to view
the Oslo Accords as another humiliating failure and more broken promises.
Additionally, the Palestinians started to view the PA, which was created by the
Oslo process, as corrupt (Shikaki 2007b).
Another important event for Hamas was the start of the second intifada in
2000. Just two months after the peace talks at Camp David failed, the intifada
began (Shikaki 2007b). In response, the Israelis began their own campaign against
the Palestinian population, leading to mass suffering (Shikaki 2007b). In turn,
reacting to their suffering and frustration, the Palestinians advocated violence
against Israelis (Ibid). Of course, this lead to more support for Hamas, who was
willing to carry out an armed struggle with Israel, in contrast to the non-violent
PLO. The situation in the territories continued to get worse, with the level of
poverty eventually exceeding 50% (Shikaki 2007b). However, Fatah faced
mounting unity problems within their own group and the PA was unable to
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deliver any social services (Ibid). Again, Hamas was provided the lacking
services, proving their resilience in fighting the Israelis as well as their dedication
to helping their fellow Palestinians.
Finally, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was credited to Hamas
and their violent struggle against Israel (Shikaki 2007b). When Israel wanted to
pull out of Gaza, the US supported the Israeli government (Shikaki 2006).
Consequently, this action did little to show that Fatah was working towards a
peace agreement. If the US had encouraged Israel to work with Fatah, then some
credit and recognition would have fallen upon the Abbas government. This would
have been beneficial for Israel as well since, ostensibly, Israel would rather see
Fatah in power than Hamas. Instead, Israel acted independently and 75% of
Palestinians see the unilateral withdrawal as a victory and direct response to the
armed struggle waged by Hamas (Palestinian Center…2006).

Hamas and Politics
Hamas and the PLO: Cooperation for Palestinian Unity
Although Hamas and the PLO have always been at odds, the two have
maintained a relatively peaceful relationship due to both organizations’ desire to
avoid fighting and preserve unity amongst Palestinians. While this relationship is
maintained even today, other factors have supplemented the reasons for
cooperation between the two groups. From Hamas’s inception, the PLO has
criticized the group for breaking unity and not joining the organization (Mishal
84:2000). However, initially, Hamas was willing to cooperate or at least not
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aggravate the PLO because of Hamas’s relative political weakness (Mishal 83:
2000). Still, Hamas criticized the PLO and refused to join the organization
because of its secular nature and its willingness to “recognize the Jewish enemy
and to abandon the greater part of Palestine” (Mishal 84:2000). Nonetheless,
Hamas rationalized its cooperation with the secular PLO by citing the need to
prevent fighting among Palestinians. Hamas leaders made it perfectly clear,
however, that cooperating with the PLO did not mean that the movement was
accepting the peace process or the PLO’s role within the process (Mishal
85:2000). In other words, Hamas had an understanding with the PLO to avoid
civil conflict but wanted to ensure that abstaining from fighting was not
misconstrued or misunderstood to be tacit support of the PLO or its policies.
Despite a mutual agreement that the preservation of Palestinian unity was
more important than the differences between the groups, tensions did erupt into
violence on occasion. In 1992, clashes between Fatah and Hamas became too
much for the fragile cooperation agreement to withstand. Fatah was angry over
the execution of some of its members by Hamas, and in retaliation started to
disrupt prayers, attack clergy members and vandalize mosques (Mishal 95: 2000).
Eventually, the conflict moved into murders on both sides and violence in the
streets. However, on June 7, 1992 a “document of honor” was released which
ended the violence and restated the need for Palestinian unity (Ibid). Nevertheless,
this was just one of many periods of tension between the two groups. Recent
conflicts between the two groups will be discussed later.
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Relations with other Nations/Groups: Prior to 2006 Elections
Even though Israel, the US, and the EU have all labeled Hamas as a
terrorist organization, other nations and groups have a history with Hamas and
some continue relations with Hamas. One nation which has had a history with
Hamas is Iran. In 1992, the two reached an agreement that stipulated that Iran
would support Hamas “politically and materially” (Mishal 97:2000). Following
this agreement, Hamas opened an office in Tehran headed by Ibrahim Ghawsha
(Ibid). Ghawsha then negotiated an agreement with Iran that called for military
and financial assistance, political facilities and a radio station (Ibid). Outside
leaders solicited other nations as well and were able to gain influence due to their
fundraising abilities.
While these new relationships and subsequent funding offers seem as
though they are beneficial, many members of the “inside” leadership of Hamas
did not appreciate the new alliances. These members wanted the movement to
focus more on keeping Hamas within Palestine so that the control would remain
with the “inside” leadership (Mishal 97:2000). Furthermore, some members of the
inside wanted to advocate a more peaceful approach in order to avoid repression
after the mass deportation in 1992 (Ibid). Nonetheless, the agreement with Iran
stood and other fundraising efforts continued as they were deemed necessary in
order to receive enough funding for Hamas’s programs.
Besides funding, Hamas also had relations with other groups for strategic
purposes. One group is Hizbollah, a terrorist group based in Lebanon. Hamas’s
relations with Hizbollah increased as a result of the deportation of Hamas activists

26
in 1992. While spending almost a full year in the south of Lebanon, Hamas
activists were able to learn about Hizbollah and their experience with fighting
Israel in the early 80s (Mishal 66:2000). Hizbollah had been able to drive Israel
out of Lebanon in 1985 in part due to its attacks against Israelis (Ibid). Therefore,
it is not surprising that Hamas’s first suicide bombing took place after the
deportees had returned (Ibid).

Hamas and Elections Prior to 2006
Even though the 2006 elections proved to be an unparalleled success for
Hamas, the organization has a history of participating in local elections for school
board, professional groups and the like. Nonetheless, Hamas had always refrained
from running in national elections for a couple of reasons. In 1992, Hamas
circulated a document amongst its leadership in order to determine whether or not
the movement should participate in the upcoming elections (Mishal 121:2000).
The paper lays out the pros and cons of four different options: participating in the
elections, boycotting the elections, boycotting and disrupting the elections, or
participating under a different name (Mishal 124: 2000).
The advantages of participating were quite obvious in that if Hamas won
they would prevent the movement from being isolated politically, prove the
popularity of the movement, and gain more control in the political process (Ibid).
On the other hand, both forms of boycotting did not seem appealing as they could
lead to isolation or military confrontation with Fatah (Mishal 125:2000). Finally,
participating under a different name might not garner enough support and could
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confuse the public (Ibid). Simply by looking at the options, without considering
outside factors, participation appeared to be the best option.
Nevertheless, in the end, the leaders of Hamas decided not to participate in
the elections because of the ramifications that would lend tacit support to the Oslo
Accords (Mishal 133:2000). However, Hamas did “unofficially” participate by
advocating the election of candidates that the group deemed closest to the
movement’s ideology and vision (Mishal 136:2000). Even though the document
does not seem to have effected Hamas’s decision towards elections, the nature of
the text disseminated to the Hamas leaders, and the discussion that took place
within the text, proves the political realism of Hamas and its use of rational
thought. The entire paper is free of religious rhetoric or symbols and merely
examines the alternatives. This is an important point to make because it
demonstrates that Hamas is not a group of religious zealots who refuse to analyze
problems outside of a religious lens. Furthermore, keeping in mind that Hamas
did not want to participate in the 1994 elections because of its connection to the
Oslo Accords, since Hamas participated in the 2006 elections, the movement is
obviously more receptive to accepting previous agreements with Israel.

Establishing a Separate Political Party
Since Hamas had participated in local elections, as early as 1992, the
movement started to consider establishing a political party that would be separate
from Hamas (Mishal 140:2000). Advocates of creating a new party argued that by
having a political party representing the interests of Hamas, the movement would
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be able to better preserve its interests and achievements while at the same time
preventing the likelihood of repression against the movement (Ibid). Furthermore,
this would solve the dilemma that Hamas faced in deciding whether or not to
participate in elections. Hamas would not have to implicitly recognize the Oslo
Accords by participating, but would still have representation in the political realm
(Mishal 142: 2000). Opponents stressed that the creation of a party could lead to
Hamas being identified solely with politics which would deter some of its militant
members (Ibid).
Although the leadership eventually decided against forming a party, they
did outline what the party would do had there been one. Essentially, the party
would have four central tasks. First, the party would be a representative of all who
shared Hamas’s Islamic vision but would need to ensure Hamas’s right to armed
struggle with Israel (Mishal 142:2000). Secondly, the party would promote
Islamist values. Third, it would work politically for the goals of Hamas. Finally, it
would serve as a framework for participating in other elections (Ibid).
One inference that could be made from Hamas’s decision not to form a
separate political party is that the group is willing to accept a truce. Hamas has
voiced that they would agree to a hudna. Furthermore, Hamas knows that they
must moderate because they joined the political system. Conversely, if the
movement wanted to circumvent the issue of violence, forming a separate party
would have been beneficial. The new party could maintain that it had no
connection or power over Hamas, leaving Hamas free to continue its armed
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resistance. However, Hamas chose to run as Hamas and consequently, will be
subject to more conventional rules and practices.

Cases of Islamist Groups’ Political Inclusion
Historically, other nations have also faced the task of moderating Islamist
groups and have met varying degrees of success. One such example is Turkey.
The Islamist movement headed by the Islamist Justice and Development Party
(AKP) was successfully drawn into the political realm as demonstrated by the
leader of the group, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been serving as the Prime
Minister of Turkey for four years (Herzog 2006). While this example shows some
promise for Hamas, it is also important to note that Turkey is often a political
exception in the Middle East as it has maintained a secular state. Furthermore, the
moderate stance of the AKP could potentially be partially a result of strict state
intervention in Turkey (Herzog 2006).
Jordan is another Middle Eastern nation that has been able to incorporate
an Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, into its political sphere. Beyond
participating in Jordan’s government, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan actually
has sided with the ruling Hashemite family in times of political turmoil such as
the al Qaeda bombings (Herzog 2006). The Muslim Brotherhood is also prevalent
in Egypt, where the group was founded; however, in Egypt the group has been
less successful in becoming a major player in national politics. After a series of
violent events, peaking with the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi
Nokrashi, the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed in 1954 (Herzog 2006). Clearly,
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as a result, the group became disconnected with the political realm. Currently, the
more moderate members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been able to run as
independents and have focused on social and religious aspects, gradually gaining
strength and becoming the leading opposition group (Herzog 2006).
A final example and comparison to Hamas is Hizbollah in Lebanon. Just
in 2005, Hizbollah was able to join the government for the first time (Herzog
2006). Unfortunately, Hizbollah does not provide a promising history lesson.
After gaining political power, Hizbollah did not feel the need to succumb to
pressures to disarm (Herzog 2006). Conversely, Hizbollah has carried out attacks
on Israel since gaining power, as demonstrated by mounting political tensions
between Israel and Lebanon which escalated into chaos just last summer.
So, what do these examples mean in regards to Hamas? After analyzing
the above examples, Michael Herzog of Foreign Affairs lists three factors for
assimilating Islamist groups into more mainstream political systems: “a strong,
healthy, relatively free political system…, a balance of power tilted against the
Islamists…, and sufficient time…” (Herzog 2006). The first factor works in two
ways. In the case of Palestine, the government system was strong, healthy, and
free enough to allow Hamas to participate. If Hamas had been unable to
participate in legitimate elections, then there would not have been any reason for
Hamas to try to win the support of more moderate voters. Instead, the group
would continue to heed the wishes of its extremist base (Herzog 2006). However,
since Hamas was allowed to participate in elections, the group wanted to win
votes and thus took other voters’ ideas into consideration. Additionally, now that
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Hamas is in power, they will presumably wish to stay in power. Therefore, Hamas
will likely start to moderate its views in order to appeal to the broader public. As
discussed before, polling shows that most Palestinians favor a peace agreement
with Israel, so if Hamas is forced to face the issue of peace it would be in the
group’s interest to make some compromises and adjust its hostile view towards
Israel outlined in its covenant.
Although the “state,” actually the Palestinian Authority, was strong
enough to allow for Hamas’s participation in the recent elections, it is not strong
enough to provide a check against Hamas or to push the organization to disarm.
The state should have powerful institutions to carry out its will as well as a
monopoly on force so that order is maintained (Herzog 2006). The institutions in
the Palestinian territories are weak due to years of corruption and order is severely
lacking, allowing the stronger Hamas to pursue whatever course it desires. As the
state is not strong enough to push Hamas into disarmament, it is natural that no
single entity or combination of institutions has been able to act as a
counterbalance to Hamas. In Jordan the monarchy held power over the Muslim
Brotherhood and in Turkey the military served that role against its Islamist group;
however, in the Palestinian territories there is an absence of a countervailing
institutional power. However, once Fatah re-organizes and improves its image, it
will be able to counter Hamas more strongly. Even now, Fatah and Hamas have
an almost equal share of the Palestinians support.
Finally, time also seems as though it is not on Hamas’s side. As with many
political changes, moving towards a non-violent stance takes time. In Egypt it
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took decades before the Muslim Brotherhood denounced the use of violence
(Herzog 2006). Even a Western democracy, Ireland, needed seven years for the
IRA to give up its arms (Herzog 2006). Therefore, it is not realistic to believe that
Hamas will disarm itself immediately because they won elections and are being
pressured to do so. Further complicating the issue is the conflict between Israel
and Palestine. Nations such as Egypt and Ireland only faced internal conflicts and
therefore it was easier to get the support of the people behind a non-violent
motion; however, Palestinians are dealing with international conflict as well.
Thus, Hamas can unite Palestinians and evoke nationalistic sentiment in order to
justify and continue their armed struggle.
While it appears that the odds of Hamas completely moderating their
position are not overwhelming to say the least, this does not mean that Hamas can
not become an important and beneficial part of the Palestinian leadership and
government. As will be discussed later, Hamas has moderated to a degree.
Furthermore, Hamas has proven extremely affective in delivering services
generally supplied by the government such as education, health services, and
social programs. Therefore, given the right incentives and degree of international
cooperation, Hamas could easily become a great asset to the Palestinian people
and a beacon of hope for the development of a more legitimate government.

33
2006 Elections
Greater Democratization for Palestine?
Allowing Hamas to participate in the elections was a controversial action;
however not doing so could have resulted in a worse situation for the Palestinians.
Before looking at the alternative to the elections, an examination of how the
situation arose is pertinent. After Yassir Arafat’s death in November 2004, the
political system of Palestine became more open because of President Abbas’
desire to integrate all groups in an attempt to avoid fighting amongst Palestinians
(Shikaki 2007b). Consequently, this provided the opportunity for Hamas to
become integrated into the system starting with local elections in December
(Ibid). Then, in March 2005, the Cairo Declaration was established between
nationalists and Islamists which provided for parliamentary elections including
Hamas candidates, a new electoral system, and an invite extended to Hamas to
join the PLO (Shikaki 2007b). For Hamas’s end of the bargain, the movement
was to agree to a cease-fire (Ibid). In this light, it is clear that the elections had to
be held in order to prevent the outbreak of violence and perhaps civil war.
Additionally, Fatah saw the elections as a way to enhance the legitimacy of the
PLO (Shikaki 2007b).
The elections themselves were amazingly democratic, despite some
nations’ negative reaction towards the outcome. International and domestic
election monitors alike categorized the elections as “free, fair and honest” (Usher
2006). Furthermore, with 77% participation, the elections in Palestine had a larger
turnout than the US has ever experienced since statistics have been recorded
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(Usher 2006). The largest voter turnout for a presidential election in the US was
63.1% in 1960 (National…2007). Clearly, the Palestinians are eager for
democracy and for the chance to participate in their government (See Appendix C
and D for detailed election results).
As for its effects on Hamas, participating in the democratic process and
increased political activity could moderate Hamas and help lead to peace. Ziad
Abu Amr, an independent member of Parliament, voiced that Hamas has already
taken the first step towards a more moderate stance and that the “fact that Hamas
is part of the Palestinian Authority is already a sign that they are prepared to
compromise” (Robinson 2006). Still, concern has been expressed that Hamas is
only trying to grab power and will revert to old policies once it gains power.
Now that Hamas has been incorporated into the government, it is possible
that they will shift into a mode of political survival rather than violence and terror
(Malka 2005). Violence will increasingly become a less acceptable method for
voicing discontent or effecting change since Hamas now has a political avenue for
influencing policy. Still, militant supporters of Hamas must also accept this antiviolent strategy in order for any real progress to be made. However, President
Abbas believes that the people will agree that this is the most desirable way for
Hamas to operate (Malka 2005). Additionally, Hamas’s supporters now have
representation of their views in government, and therefore, should start to feel as
if they have a stake in the government. Hamas itself will also have new
responsibilities as a participant in government, rather than its former role as the
opposition and outsiders. Marina Ottaway from the Carnegie Endowment states
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that, “There is ample evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any
party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract voters
in large numbers” (Herzog 2006). Therefore, if Hamas can remain in power, there
will be very real incentives for them to adjust or manipulate their ideology in
order to provide an effective government and to keep the confidence and support
of the voters. Both voters and Hamas are stakeholders in the government now;
therefore, it is no longer solely a playground for Fatah.
Despite the wins for democracy in Palestine, the US is undoubtedly
uneasy about the outcome. The whole mission of the quest to bring democracy to
the Middle East was to uphold American ideals and to bring order to the region.
Nevertheless, Palestinians have chosen a “terrorist” group as their leaders,
diminishing the US’s hope that extreme groups would lose power under a
democracy. In this sense, the United States comes off as slightly hypocritical. The
US government touts the ideals and importance of democracy but when one of the
finest examples of democracy in the Middle East produces an unpalatable result,
the US immediately turns its back and refuses to work with the fledgling,
democratically-elected government. Thus, the lesson seems to be that if a nation
wants to be in the US’s good graces, it must not only be a democracy, but should
elect only US backed parties and candidates.

A Reflection of Discontent with Fatah
Hamas not only participated in the elections in 2006, but won 58% of the
seats (Shikaki 2006). These results were worrisome for many people who fear that
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Hamas will use its newly found power to continue building its arms or to create a
conservative, Islamic state. However, it is important to look at what its supporters
want. In fact, many of Hamas’s “supporters” actually were voting against Fatah
more so than they were voting for Hamas (Shikaki 2006). After the election of
Mahmoud Abbas, many Palestinians had hoped for better governance, economic
progress, and some headway in the peace process; however, as more and more
time elapsed without any glimpse of advancement, people slowly started to lose
hope. This disillusionment along with a conception that Fatah had “failed to
deliver results in every sphere” manifested itself in the form of a 55% increase in
support for Hamas between December 2004 and 2005 (Shikaki 2007b). As a
young Palestinian, Samer Bafrawi, stated, “It’s not that we love Hamas, but we
didn’t want Fatah anymore” (Robinson 2006). He even said that he voted for
Hamas despite the fact that he is “not really religious at all.” Even Hamas leaders
recognize the favorable conditions that surrounded the elections. Ghazi Hamad, a
Hamas spokesman, was quoted saying, “Hamas presented an alternative” (Usher
2006). Further polling done by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research showed that the main issues for voters were the corruption which they
believed to be running rampant within the Fatah party and the lacking
enforcement of order (Shikaki 2006). In light of these statements and the
undeniable fact that Fatah has made no tangible progress in forty plus years, it is
easy to understand why Palestinians would be looking for change.
Despite the Palestinians’ loss of faith in Fatah, the election of Hamas does
not signal that the Palestinian population has resigned itself to become an Islamic
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society with a goal of eliminating Israel. In fact, 77% of Palestinians supported a
cease-fire with Israel (Palestinian…2006). The Palestinian people are not warmongering, religious zealots, but a desperate population hoping that change will
bring them peace.

Fatah’s Disorganization Fuels Support for Hamas and Splits Fatah
After the results of the 2006 elections, many people within the
international community, Fatah, and even within Hamas started to wonder how
Hamas had won. It was undeniable that Hamas was gaining popularity; however,
it came as a shock to many, including Hamas members, that the movement was
able to win. Upon examination, it seems that Hamas owes its victory, in part, to
the problems that Fatah was having within its own organization. As ‘Abd alHakim Awad, the president of Fatah’s youth movement, stated, “Hamas did not
win the elections – Fatah lost them” (Usher 2006).
Undoubtedly, one of the causes of the divisions within Fatah was losing
Yassir Arafat as a leader in 2004. The death of Arafat not only had national
consequences in bringing about a change in the mindset of the leadership, but also
had repercussions within Fatah itself. Though Abbas emerged as the virtually
undisputed successor to Arafat, he has been unable to evoke the same sense of
loyalty, either because of personality traits or a less authoritative stance. Thus,
conflicts among Fatah members are not controlled by Abbas as they were under
Arafat’s reign (Skikaki 2007).
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Furthermore, the calling of elections by Abbas, which presumably would
not have happened in the same fashion under Arafat, sparked the beginning of a
process that would undermine the cohesion of the Fatah party and eventually lead
to its electoral loss to Hamas. Abbas wanted to address corruption in Fatah by
making the organization more democratic. Therefore in January 2005, to prepare
for the elections, Abbas called for the convening of the Fatah General Conference
(FGC) (Usher 2006). This move had the support of most of the young members
and some of the old members because they saw this as a way to strengthen Fatah
by recreating its image and putting new leaders in place (Usher 2006). The FGC
is the body responsible for electing members of Fatah’s two bodies that execute
policy for the organization (Ibid). However, since its meeting in 1989, it had
never convened again (Ibid). Naturally, this allowed for the same people to
remain in power and for Arafat to rule without being held accountable to the other
bodies. Unfortunately, due to delays in passing election laws and compromises
that had to be made, Abbas finally agreed not to convene the FGC until after the
parliamentary elections were held (Usher 2006). Fatah officials believed that this
was the best strategy so that it would look like Fatah was united and could work
through any internal problems (Ibid). In hindsight, convening the FGC may have
been enough for Fatah to avoid leadership problems.
The main rivalry now confronting Fatah is a division between the “old
guard” and “young guard” (Shikaki 2007b). The old guard is comprised of the
founders of the movement who have lived most of their lives in exile, while the
young guard is led by Marwan Barghouti and consisted of younger, newer
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members (Shikaki 2007b). The two groups fight over two main questions:
leadership and Hamas, but for now just the leadership question will be discussed.
In regards to leadership, both branches of Fatah believe that they should
be in control. The younger members blame the older members for the corrupt
image of Fatah and for losing the elections to Hamas (Shikaki 2007b). On the
other hand, the older members who are in charge now do not think that the
“young guard” will be able to lead Fatah and that they would be unsuccessful in
the international realm, especially with Israel (Shikaki 2007b). In part, this
apprehension from the “old guard” stems from the disunity and lack of solid
leadership amongst the younger members. The only widely respected leader is
Barghouti with the rest of the “young guard” vying for power and split on the
basis of geography and sociopolitical lines (Shikaki 2007b).
In light of the division and struggle for power between the “young” and
“old” guard, not convening the FGC turned out to be more problematic than
anticipated. Once Fatah started to hold its first primaries, Barghouti (the leader of
the “young guard”) won by overwhelmingly large margins in the West Bank
(Usher 2006). Not surprisingly, this worried the “old guard” who wanted to
maintain power and ensure that a repeat of the West Bank primaries was not
witnessed in Gaza. Thus, polls were rigged and militias showed up at polling
places, causing Abbas to cancel the rest of the primaries and to nullify all the ones
that had already taken place (Usher 2006). Consequently, other militias retaliated
by making their force known at the presidential compound in protest of the
suspension of the primaries (Ibid). The conflict was “resolved” by combining
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candidates into a “unified” list (Ibid). Due to the discontent brought on by the
primaries and the combination of old and young onto one list, only a week before
elections, 120 independent candidates emerged to challenge 130 Fatah candidates
and the rest (Ibid). By protesting the way the list selection was made, the
“independent” candidates that were really disgruntled Fatah members, essentially
divided the Fatah ticket and helped Hamas to win the elections.

Hamas’s Constituency: Who Supports Hamas?
After Hamas won the elections, concern was expressed about what their
win meant. Since the Palestinian people voted for a Hamas government, does that
mean that they support the creation of an Islamist state or the destruction of
Israel? Perhaps the Palestinians are a violent people, either by nature or by
creation. However, contrary to what some may believe, it is very clear that this is
not the case. Thus, it is important to analyze who supports Hamas.
By region, the Gaza Strip has traditionally been more supportive of Hamas
than the West Bank (Hilal 2006). In 2005, for example, support for Hamas in
Gaza was at 33.9% compared to 23.6% in the West Bank (Ibid). This could be
explained by the economic conditions in the West Bank, which are better than
what those living in Gaza experience. Therefore, the residents of Gaza may be
more prone to need and benefit from the social services provided by Hamas.
Another interesting factor to examine is support for Hamas by gender.
While most of the members of Hamas are male, support for Hamas is
exceptionally high among females. Females not only support Hamas over Fatah
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30.5% to 21%, but in comparison to males, the number for female supporters of
Hamas is almost double that of males (Hilal 2006). Again, Hamas’s system of
social programs likely accounts for these statistics.
One constituency that Fatah should have paid more attention to is the
Palestinian youth. Generally, losing support among the younger portions of the
population indicates that the party is losing its popular approval (Hilal 2006).
Across all age groups Fatah lost support, while Hamas gained support (Hilal
2006). However, the more significant numbers were amongst the younger groups.
For both the 18-30 and the 31-44 age brackets, support for Fatah has decreased by
almost half (Hilal 2006). Simultaneously, support for Hamas in these same
brackets has almost doubled (Ibid). Younger generations are the future of any
people and if large portions of the youngest people are moving towards
supporting a new group, it is fair to believe that the attitudes of people are also
shifting.
Another important factor to consider is income level. A common
misconception is that terrorists capitalize on the desperate situation of the poor.
While it is likely that some people have come to support Hamas because of the
social programs that it offers, Hamas is not a movement just of the poor. Across
income brackets ranging from under 300 Jordanian dinar to over 1201 dinar per
month, Hamas maintains approximately the same support level hovering around
24% of the population (Hilal 2006). Even though the social programs are a factor
in Hamas’s popularity, other events such as the second intifada and the general
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loss of faith in Fatah also account for their popularity and appeal to people in
other income brackets.
Overall, while the statistical evidence provided by Hilal is useful in
counteracting myths about who supports “terrorists” and examining trends, the
data does not help to predict who will support Hamas. Part of the reason that the
data was inconclusive in this sense is that support for Hamas hinges upon multiple
factors. The supporters are not homogeneous and have different reasons for their
support and probably represent varying degrees of support.
Of course, some areas were not addressed by the data and could account
for some of Hamas’s support. There are undoubtedly some Palestinians who voted
for Hamas because of their Islamic ideals, while others may have voted for them
because they believe in armed struggle against their oppressor. Even though this
is what governments such as the US fear, these reasons do not represent the
sentiment of most voters.

Challenges Facing Hamas
Group Cohesion
Beyond the splits between inside and outside leadership, which was
discussed previously in the section about the structure of Hamas, Hamas also
faces divisions between hard and soft-liners. More moderate leaders, the softliners, which include Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, saw Hamas’s victory as a
chance to reform and build institutions as well as to finally take steps towards
eradicating government corruption (Shikaki 2007b). In order to better achieve

43
these goals, the soft-liners do want to be seen as legitimate in the Arab and
international community (Ibid). Consequently, moderate leaders are more willing
to moderate Hamas’s position by accepting an invitation to the PLO, restricting
violence, etc. (Shikaki 2007b).
Hard-liners, including the head of the Political Bureau, Khalid Mishaal,
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmud al-Zahaar, believe that the Prisoner’s
Document, which outlines some of the above mentioned compromises, is a
betrayal to the constituency and the movement (Shikaki 2007b). Instead, hardliners believe that the policy of violence has been successful thus far and that the
movement should continue to use the same means (Ibid). Even though tensions
between Hamas leaders have always been resolved through collective leadership
in the past, these divisions will be a challenge for the movement’s cohesion,
especially when lumped in with all of the other problems facing Hamas.
Therefore, it will be important for Hamas to remain unified and to present a
coherent strategy.

Infighting
One of Hamas’s challenges upon entering into government after the
elections was to establish and maintain order and security. However, a huge
obstacle to this is the infighting between Fatah and Hamas. Although the two
groups have been in opposition for decades, the current situation is further
complicated by a fragmentation within the two groups themselves and the upset of
traditional power balances.
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After taking control of the legislature, Hamas turned to Fatah with the
ambition of forming a coalition government (Robinson 2006). Hamas’s hope was
that they would be able to handle social aspects and leave the issue of Israel to
Fatah (Robinson 2006). Unfortunately, Fatah was not to be won over by Hamas
so easily. Even within Fatah, one of the group’s main divisions is regarding what
Fatah’s relationship with Hamas should be. Again, the opposing sides are
basically divided between the “young guard” and the “old guard;” however, the
names applied to both sides are changed. The “inclusionists,” made up of the
younger members and again led by Barghouti, believe that Fatah should accept
Hamas’s victory and should join a coalition government with them (Shikaki
2007b). The inclusionists cite reasons such as the legitimacy of Hamas in the eyes
of the people, which could easily help to strengthen state institutions by giving
them a new reputation as free from corruption (Ibid). Conversely, the older
members, or “exclusionists,” want Hamas to fail and are not willing to stand by
idly and wait for them to do so on their own. Instead, the “exclusionists” are
trying to isolate Hamas and to make them loose credibility among the Palestinians
(Shikaki 2007b).
Despite the efforts of the exclusionists, President Abbas sides more with
the inclusionists and their inclination to enter into a coalition with Hamas;
therefore, Fatah announced that they would join a unity government with Hamas
under the conditions that Hamas would join the PLO and would accept PLO
agreements with Israel (Shikaki 2007b). However, Hamas was not able to agree
with these conditions. Therefore, in the end, Fatah initially opted to become the
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opposition party instead of joining Hamas (Robinson 2006). Although Hamas had
some self-serving desires underlying their proposition to Fatah, it does show that
they were willing to cooperate with Fatah, a secular group, to work together to run
Palestine. This is important in rebuffing the idea that Hamas will try to grab
power and eliminate other voices so that it can create an Islamist state.
Beyond simply not wanting to join a coalition with Hamas, some Fatah
members were completely unwilling to cooperate during normal government
functions and have tried to hinder Hamas’s government in any way possible. One
tactic that Fatah has employed is changing the government structure so that it
favors Fatah over Hamas. President Abbas created a new government position of
general-secretary, which would run the PA’s personnel, salaries, and comptroller
bodies (Usher 2006). Effectively, this new position would have control of hiring
and would report directly to Abbas (Ibid). As one may have guessed, the new
members were all supporters of Fatah (Ibid). The old parliament also tried to
create a new nine member constitutional court that would hold the power to
“cancel any law approved by parliament on the grounds that it is unconstitutional”
(Usher 2006). Both of these efforts were an attempt by Fatah to put more power
into the presidency in order to counter actions that may be taken by the new
Hamas-led government.
Exacerbating divisions between the two groups, President Abbas
announced in December 2006 that if a unity government could not be formed,
then he would call for early elections (Shikaki 2007b). This statement fueled the
armed disputes that were already taking place. On December 17, 2006 Egypt
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helped the two groups reach a truce (Hamas…2007). Nevertheless, Hamas and
Fatah continued to antagonize each other. Besides armed disputes and some
resulting deaths, kidnapping was also prevalent during the skirmishes between the
two groups. Hamas kidnapped two Fatah members and Fatah kidnapped several
Hamas members (Hamas…2007). While it appears that the men from both
factions have been released, the kidnappings were the latest in a string of events
that intensified Palestinians fears and chipped away at their hope that Hamas
would usher in a new area of progress. Eventually, a unity government was
formed in February, which will be discussed later; however, tensions between the
two groups still remain.

Control of Arms
Another challenge facing Hamas is to gain arms control. Awad, a Fatah
official, points to this problem when he says that, “Hamas is a general without an
army” (Usher 2006). While Hamas does have military operations, the PA has
70,000 men who according to Awad, “will not be subordinate to a Hamas interior
minister (Ibid).”
Upon being elected as the ruling government, Hamas placed emphasis on
restoring security as one of their main goals. Sheikh Al-Bitawi stated that some
personnel would be dismissed and the remaining members of the security forces
would be consolidated into one or two forces (Robinson 2006). Eventually,
Hamas had hoped to put the money saved by the more efficient security force
towards social programs such as schools and health care facilities (Robinson
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2006). Unfortunately, what ended up happening was that Hamas established a
new security force called the Executive Force which is under control of the
minister of the interior (Shikaki 2007b). The clashes between the new and old
force has lead to immense conflict and infighting, diminishing the hopes of many
Palestinians that the Hamas government can deliver on their promises. From late
December to early this February, more than 90 Palestinians have died due to the
fighting between gunmen (Palestinian PM…2007).
Beyond security force clashes, Hamas also must try to rein in paramilitary
and militia groups that have been set up by Fatah, but are not necessarily even
under Abbas’s control anymore (Robinson 2006). Some Fatah supporters have
called for Abbas to resign and militias have appeared outside of the president’s
compound. Additionally, other groups such as Islamic Jihad must also be
controlled (Zabriskie 2006b). If Hamas concedes too much or is seen to be
ineffectual, Islamic Jihad might become the new “Hamas.” Furthermore, for any
negotiations or a truce with Israel to work, it would require Hamas to be able to
control the actions of Islamic Jihad and other militant groups who could disrupt
the peace process.

The Formation of a Unity Government
On February 8, 2007, President Abbas of Fatah and Khaled Mishaal, the
head of Hamas’s political bureau, signed the Mecca Declaration at a ceremony
with King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia which outlines the formation of a unity
government between the two rivals (Palestinian Rivals…2007). Celebrations
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broke out in the streets of Gaza, as Palestinians hope that this will mark the end of
the infighting.
As part of the agreement between Hamas and Fatah, the cabinet positions
are to be divided between the two groups (Palestinian PM…2007). Hamas is
going to fill nine of the positions, Fatah will be granted six, and one each will go
to four other parties (Palestinian Rivals…2007). One of the main points of
contention was regarding who would hold control over the interior, a crucial
position that oversees the security forces. According to reports, the controversial
positions of finance, foreign affairs, and interior will all be going to independents
(Palestinian Rivals…2007). Again, this compromise demonstrates the strong
desire, on the part of both groups, to prevent infighting amongst Palestinians.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Haniyeh will keep his position (Ibid). In November,
he had offered to resign if that was necessary to bring an end to the boycott and to
make progress for the people of Palestine. "If we have to choose between the
siege and myself, we must lift the siege and end the suffering” (Palestinian
PM…2006), Haniyeh said. Fortunately for Hamas, it did not come to this.
After the agreement between Hamas and Fatah to form a new unity
government, Palestinian leaders have been urging the international community to
end its boycott. Even the location of the agreement was important in this respect.
Saudi Arabia was a strategic choice because of its close relationship to the US
(Shikaki 2007a). The involved parties hope that the US will not be as hostile
towards the agreement and will be more willing to give it a fair consideration
because of the role the Saudis played, especially in comparison to what may have
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happened if it had been another nation such as Iran instead of Saudi Arabia (Ibid).
Prime Minister Haniyeh made his plea, “I say to the Quartet and to the European
Union that this is the will of the Palestinian people….They should respect it and
they should work to end the status of siege” (Palestinian PM…2007).
EU foreign ministers said that they will wait until the government is
formed before they pass judgment one way or the other (Ibid). They also issued a
statement that they will not work with the government if it does not agree to the
same three conditions that were put to Hamas (Ibid). However, the Mecca
Declaration does not make any reference to the formal recognition of Israel, one
of the conditions that the West has been adamant about (Palestinian
Rivals…2007). While this could become a major setback in the peace process,
perhaps the Palestinian government can agree to the conditions without Hamas
having to explicitly do so. If this were the case, Hamas would be able to retain its
ideology and constituency support. If not, Hamas has tried to appease the Quartet
by agreeing to respect past Palestinian agreements that have recognized Israel
(Palestinian PM…2007). Previously when Hamas has agreed to respect past
agreements, it was always contingent upon if the agreements corresponded with
Palestinian rights and interests (Shikaki 2007a). However, with the Mecca
Declaration, Hamas has dropped this last condition (Ibid). Nonetheless, this is
likely to fall short of the Quartet’s expectations (Palestinian PM…2007).
Still, the West should reconsider their position and help strengthen the
agreement between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement seems to be the best way to
get Hamas on board with the two-state solution and to start the peace process
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rolling again. Also, the Mecca Declaration will help Abbas to be a much stronger
leader. His leadership will be necessary for reforming Fatah, but more importantly
for the strength of the unity government and the fate of Palestine. Domestically,
Abbas has been designated as the person who will mediate any disputes amongst
cabinets (Shikaki 2007a). This will be extremely important for matters concerning
security, but will also affect other important departments such as finance and
foreign affairs (Ibid). Furthermore, Abbas has proven to be acceptable to the
West.
Complementing his domestic prowess will be Abbas’s new legitimacy as a
negotiator. Since Hamas is united with Fatah, any agreement that Abbas makes
with Israel cannot be deemed as treason or against the will of Palestinians by
Hamas because the movement is part of the government that is formulating the
agreements (Shikaki 2007a). With the two groups working together they should
be able to quell problems within the Palestinian territories and to control other
groups such as Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, any international negotiations and
peace agreements will be made stronger due to their inclusive nature. Thus, this
unity government is a significant development for the Palestinian government and
one that the West should take seriously. If the West gives this new government a
chance, it seems as though the Hamas-Fatah coalition could provide hope for real
advances in the peace process that were unthinkable under Arafat.

International Response to Hamas’s Electoral Victory
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With Hamas taking control of the government, many Western nations
faced the problem of deciding what to do about the results. Many of the countries,
such as the US, Israel, and the EU as a whole, had previously labeled Hamas as a
terrorist group. Thus, the question became whether or not funds should be
withheld so that the Western governments are not funding “terrorists.”
Even though many nations expressed concern about continuing to fund the
PA, Israel and the Quartet were able to agree upon the conditions in which they
would maintain their current contributions. The three conditions laid out by acting
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert were: (1) the Hamas charter is changed to recognize
Israel; (2) Total disarmament and the end to all terrorist activity; and (3)
acceptance of all previous agreements between Israel and the PA (Usher 2006).
While these conditions may appear to be reasonable, they rely upon small
distinctions that made them impossible for Hamas to accept.
The first condition of recognizing Israel has been a sticking point for
years. However, Hamas has recognized the reality that Israel does exist, they just
refuse to recognize the legitimacy or the right of Israel to exist (Usher 2006).
Furthermore, one reason Hamas cited in the past for not participating in elections
was that the PA was established through illegitimate means of recognizing and
negotiating with Israel. Consequently, Hamas’s willingness to participate now
demonstrates their resignation that Israel exists and that they must have some sort
of relations with Israel. To ask them to change the wording of the charter is
excessive. For one, even Fatah did not change the wording of its constitution. A
Fatah leader, Taysir Nasrallah, stated that the FGC technically still states that the
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group is committed to “armed struggle, people’s war, and the liberation of
Palestine from the river to the sea” (Usher 2006). Obviously this statement is a far
cry from recognizing Israel’s right to exist; nevertheless, Israel has been allowing
for the transfer of funds to the PA under Fatah’s control for years.
While the first condition seems to be founded in semantics, the second
condition of disarmament and the end to terrorist activity appears to be more
straight-forward. Under the circumstances, it would not be in Hamas’s interest to
disarm; especially in light of the tension between itself and Fatah. If they were to
completely disarm, Fatah would have an edge on the group if tensions were to
erupt into something more. Additionally, many Palestinians viewed Hamas’s
armed struggle against Israel as a cause for the disengagement from Gaza
(Shikaki 2007b). Thus, it would be crucial for Hamas to maintain its arms and to
leave the option of armed struggle open in case their experiment with trying
conventional means to achieve their goals does not pay off. Furthermore, the
notion of relinquishing violent tactics is one of the few bargaining chips that
Hamas can use in negotiations. Therefore, Hamas could give up violence, as part
of a negotiation, if Hamas and the Palestinians will get something in return.
Finally, the third condition has been addressed by some members of
Hamas. Statements have been made to the effect that previous agreements would
be honored if they were not in direct conflict with Palestinian national interests
(Usher 2006). Clearly, Hamas is not going to reverse or avoid all agreements from
the past. The PA itself was a product of one such agreement and Hamas is
working within it. Instead of focusing on explicit acceptance of every agreement
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from the past, Israel and its supporters should be more concerned with
commencing new talks and striving towards new agreements. Nevertheless, the
conditions held and Hamas did not comply, the result of which lead to Hamas’s
isolation.
The above-mentioned cessation of funding put forth by the Quartet was
not to be carried out immediately though. Five days after the elections, the
Quartet comprised of the EU, UN, US, and Russia met in London to discuss
funding (Usher 2006). The consensus was that funds would continue to be sent to
the PA until the new government was formed (Ibid). According to US Secretary
of State, Condoleeza Rice, three reasons led the group to this decision: (1) to
strengthen Abbas’s presidency; (2) to prevent retaliation that could help extreme
parties in the upcoming Israeli elections come to power; and (3) to prevent Iran
from furthering its influence by becoming the substitute for funding (Usher 2006).
Although the Quartet agreed with the conditions upon which Hamas had
to comply in order to continue proper relations, some nations did not agree with
completely severing ties with Hamas while others actually sought to aid Hamas.
One, perhaps surprising detractor was Russia, a member of the Quartet. President
Putin thought it would be “counterproductive” to completely cut all relations with
the fledgling government (Usher 2006). Putin made his opinion known, and even
invited Hamas to send a delegation to Moscow (Usher 2006). Clearly, Putin was
willing to act upon his convictions rather than succumb to the wishes of the
Quartet. He also had the support of France (Usher 2006). Furthermore, both
Turkey and South Africa have also extended their hands to Hamas (Ibid). While
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these few countries do not constitute a majority, the support of a few nations does
provide hope for Palestinians and Hamas that other countries will follow.
In addition to the withholding of Palestinian revenues, Israel has also
banned the movement of all Hamas officials, including MPs (Usher 2006). This
does not seem to have any justification other than the desire to prevent the Hamas
government from functioning properly and undermining the ability of its officials
to carry out their duties. The Defense Minister of Israel, Shaul Mofaz, took the
Israeli policy of undermining Hamas even further when he stated that Israel would
be willing to pursue harsher policies if Hamas did not meet its conditions. These
measures could possibly include acts such as banning all Gaza workers from
entering Israel, eliminating its customs union with the PA, and even cutting off
water and electricity supplies to the territories (Usher 2006). Outrageously, Mofaz
also stated that if Hamas is shown to be involved in violence, Israel will start to
assassinate its leaders, including the Prime Minister Haniyeh (Ibid). These threats
seem particularly cruel and in violation of human rights. Furthermore, if it could
be conceded that Israel is right or justified in assassinating Hamas leaders, the
Israeli government should perhaps use a bit more discretion in who they target.
Murdering moderates such as Haniyeh will only incite outrage and leave the more
extreme members to capitalize on the Palestinians rage in order to promote their
more radical proposals.
Although the US tried to stir support for their stance towards Hamas,
Secretary Rice fell short. In February, after the elections, Secretary Rice traveled
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in order to try to convince
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them to adopt the US line (Usher 2006). Each country turned her down, in part
because they had already witnessed that Hamas was not to be persuaded by
threats (Ibid).
In order to counter the sanctions that Hamas was going to be faced with
from the West, Khalid Mishal (head of Hamas’s political department) visited
Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to stir up support for Hamas (Usher 2006).
Hamas has a long history with Saudi Arabia, who was their main sponsor for
years (Ibid). This relationship did not falter any after the elections, and Saudi
Arabia pledged to give Hamas more money (Ibid). The Turkish government
offered to help mediate between Palestine and Israel when the time came and the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt agreed to start a world-wide fundraising drive for
Hamas (Ibid). Finally, The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Musa,
agreed to put a motion to the Arab League at the next summit that would call for
monthly contributions to the PA in order to account for the money being withheld
by Israel (Ibid). While this seems as though Hamas did well for itself in its tour
for aid, Arab unity has proven to be shaky at best. Egypt often sides with the West
as far as the terms being put forth to Hamas (Ibid). Furthermore, the relationship
between Jordan and Hamas has been rocky since the “outside” leaders of Hamas
were expelled from Jordan in 1999 (Usher 2006). There is also the influence of
the West to think about as well as the nations’ own problems. Nations such as
Syria, Lebanon, and the organization of Hizbollah might wish to help Hamas, but
have a lot on their plate already (Usher 2006).
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One nation that has been steadfast in their support and has followed
through thus far is Iran. In February 2006, Mishal asked Iran for more money,
even though Iran already gives Hamas $10 million a month (Usher 2006). Still,
Iran pledged to give Hamas a financial package that has been rumored to be in the
sum of $250 million (Ibid). Despite Iran’s obvious willingness to continue to give
to Hamas whatever it can, some Hamas leaders are weary of becoming too
dependent on Iran. One reason for this apprehension is the reaction of the US. The
US has been at odds with Iran and their President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and
would take Hamas’s close relationship with Iran as another reason why the West
should not work with Hamas’s government (Usher 2006). As far as their own
internal politics, Hamas is fearful that if ties to Iran become too great, they will no
longer be in control of their own government. “We don’t want to be a tool of
anyone’s policy,” explains Atef Udwan, a new representative of Northern Gaza
(Usher 2006).
More recently, Hamas has secured the help of the government of Qatar. In
December 2006, the government of Qatar agreed to pay the wages of 40,000
teachers who had been on strike due to unpaid wages (Qatar…2006). The
generous aid package will total more than $22 million a month (Ibid).
Furthermore, the teachers had just gone back to work with promises of being paid,
which will now be fulfilled with the money from Qatar. Additionally, the Qatari
government is considering granting another $7 million per month that would go to
the health sector (Qatar…2006). This aid would be extremely helpful to the
Palestinians who are facing some of the worse poverty rates they have seen since
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the occupation began. It will also greatly reduce the internal pressure on Hamas to
alleviate incredibly harsh economic conditions and to pay their workers’ wages.
One country that seems to be having second thoughts about the Western
nations’ boycott of Hamas is the United Kingdom. The Commons International
Development Committee, comprised of British MPs, has started to voice its
discontent with the boycott (UK warning…2007). The committee is worried that
the boycotts will hinder the peace process, lead to violence, and push Hamas
closer to Iran (Ibid). The boycott clearly hinders the peace process because
Israelis and Palestinians are not negotiating or talking to each other. Thus far,
Hamas has also been looking to Iran for aid, so the assumption that the boycott
will lead to a closer relationship between Iran and Hamas is not unreasonable or
unfounded. Furthermore, the boycott is significantly affecting the situation in the
territories and the lives of the Palestinians. As a result of these factors, the
committee recommended that pressure on Hamas to moderate its policies should
be pursued by entering into a dialogue with them and including them in the
process, rather than isolating them with boycotts (UK Warning…2007). Isolation
only seems to solidify a movement in its fight against the isolators and to justify
radical means by those being isolated.
Although Hamas has recruited aid from some countries, the funds have not
been enough to suppress the plummeting economic situation in the Palestinian
territories. However, as discussed above, many countries and officials are
reconsidering their positions towards Hamas, especially now that the unity
government has been formed. Therefore, it is important for Hamas to continue to
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present itself as a viable, legitimate partner for peace and to persist in engaging
other countries in dialogue.
Lack of Funding
Eventually, the sanctions and boycotts against the Hamas-led government
were put into effect. The US and the EU stopped hundreds of millions of dollars
in aid to Palestine (Palestinian 2006). This adds an extreme burden on the
government which is already facing a $900 million deficit (Usher 2006).
Additionally, the money for payment for taxes and customs collected on
Palestinian goods, amounting to approximately $50 million a month, which
usually goes to pay Palestinian government workers, is being withheld by Israel
(Zabriskie 2006b). While losing $50 million seems as though it would be
damaging enough on its own, for the PA, it hit the economy hard because the sum
amounted to 60% of its domestic revenues (Shikaki 2007b). As a result, the
government was unable to pay the $116 million (Usher 2006) in wages to 165,000
government workers, causing a ripple of protests and civil unrest (Palestinian
2006). Beyond protests, the economy is being severely damaged. Since people are
not being paid, they can not afford to buy anything (Zabriskie 2006b). It is
estimated that the industrial sector for Gaza alone has lost $35 million (Palestinian
2006). Furthermore, children have been kept away from school as teachers cancel
class due to lack of payment of wages (Palestinian 2006).
Initially, most Palestinians blamed the West for refusing to continue
giving aid and Israel for withholding money rightfully owed to the Palestinians;
however, as the situation worsens and people need to worry about feeding their
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families, anger is slowly being turned towards the Palestinian government
(Palestinian 2006). During protests, a religious leader, Sheikh Majid Dwikat,
voiced his frustration by stating that “if this government can’t function, it has to
think carefully about its people and change its political way of thinking”
(Palestinian 2006). More and more Palestinians are starting to share Dwikat’s
opinion, which could help Hamas to moderate or could push Hamas out of power
and back towards more violent means. Also, if Hamas fails as a government it
may become harder for the more moderate leaders to remain in power as the more
extreme leaders will point to Hamas’s political failure as a sign that it was a
mistake to try to pursue a political course and that the goals of the organization
would be better accomplished through terrorist means.
While rescinding aid is clearly not a good idea, some have suggested that
aid should be given discriminately. It has been proposed that the aid should be
shaped to strengthen the Palestinian government by helping to reorganize the
Fatah party or to give money to programs designed by more moderate parties and
members (Herzog 2006). However, part of the problem is that under Israeli law,
it’s illegal to give money to terrorists (Robinson 2006). The U.S. also has a
similar law that is blocking aid (Robinson 2006).

Implications of the 2006 Elections
Financial Boycott Will Force Hamas to Moderate
The members of the international community who are participating in the
boycott of the Hamas-led government hope to achieve one of two aims: either
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Hamas will moderate its position or the Palestinian people will be plunged into a
situation so dire that they will turn against Hamas (Shikaki 2007b). Thus far,
neither of these scenarios has materialized as the boycotters would have hoped.
Hamas has made statements declaring its willingness to compromise, but all have
fallen short of the requests that the West has made. Secondly, the Palestinian
people have yet to lose complete faith in Hamas. There have been instances of
strike and discontent, which have been represented in opinion polls. In September
2006, 69% of the public did not approve of Hamas economic performance and
54% were dissatisfied overall (Shikaki 2007b). Nevertheless, the overall level of
support for Hamas has remained relatively unchanged (Ibid). Therefore, I do not
think that the boycott is a fair tactic, nor will it likely evoke much change besides
enhancing the suffering of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the Palestinians
are likely to link their misery to the Western boycott and not the Hamas
government.

Hamas is willing to Compromise: Cease-Fire
Even though the boycott is unlikely to change Hamas’s positions, the
organization has shown signs of moderation. Hamas has on a few occasions
agreed to a cease-fire with Israel. These cease-fires could be viewed as a
demonstration that Hamas is willing to end violence and work towards peace with
Israel. Unfortunately, cease fires tend to get broken when it comes to Israel and
Palestine. Recently, after sixteen months of a cease-fire, in June 2006, the head of
the security force in Gaza, Jamal Abu Samhadana, was assassinated by an Israeli
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missile strike, infuriating Hamas members (Zabriskie 2006). This act was closely
followed by another attack that would incite Hamas to turn back to violence. A
Gaza beach was shelled by Israel and seven people were killed (Zabriskie 2006).
This strike worked to unite Palestinians who were all upset by the indifference to
Palestinian life demonstrated by the attack. Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail
Haniyeh went so far as to call the attack on the beach a “war crime” (Zabriskie
2006). A situation such as this only exacerbates the peace process. Even
Palestinians who do not support Hamas became angered and will generally direct
this anger towards Israel (Zabriskie 2006). Any previous annoyance with their
own government and the economic problems that came hand in hand with the
election of Hamas will be overpowered by anger towards Israel and a unified
nationalistic feeling. Also, Hamas’s response of fifteen or so rockets launched
into Israel seem justified, even if immoral, to many Palestinians.
If Israel truly wanted Hamas out of power, assassinating its leaders and
attacking Gaza definitely was a miscalculation. In the absence of attacks, the
Palestinian people would be left to focus and dwell on their poor state of affairs
since Hamas has taken over government leadership. Eventually, their
dissatisfaction could have lead to a turn for the worse for Hamas; however, Israel
has given Hamas new life and has re-directed the Palestinians attention towards
international affairs instead of their domestic woes. Nevertheless, Hamas has
repeatedly stated that a cease-fire would be acceptable to them.

Hamas’s Strategy: Moderation?
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The international community is pushing Hamas to make decisions about
Israeli and Western matters; however, Hamas wants to take time to focus on
Palestine. A political scientist at An-Najah National University in Nablus
explains, “They want to build a new Palestinian society. They’re not going to talk
about the road map. They’re going to talk about the rights of Palestinian refugees.
They’re not going to talk about the security of Israel. They’re going to talk about
Palestinian security” (Robinson 2006). A new MP, Shaykh Ahmad Haj Ali
outlines Hamas’s strategy in the following manner:

Our aim is governance, and one can only govern through the institutions
of government. But in all cases our priority now is to address the internal
Palestinian situation rather than the confrontations with Israel. We would
negotiate with Israel, since that is the power that usurped our rights. If
negotiations fail, we will call on the world to intervene. If this fails, we
will go back to resistance. But if Israel were to agree with our
internationally recognized rights – including the refugees’ right of returnwe would seriously consider recognizing Israel in the interests of world
peace. If it does not, we would seriously consider issuing a fatwa calling
on all Muslims – and not just Palestinians – to wage a jihad against the
usurper.
-Usher 2006
As Ali articulates, Palestinians and Hamas in particular are looking for progress
that will improve their daily life, not just empty promises and agreements that
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make Israel more comfortable. The Western community should remember that
while they are asking for concessions from Hamas before negotiations even start,
they are not offering anything in return that will help the Hamas government
achieve its goals of making real progress. Nevertheless, even though Hamas
originally wanted to pursue a domestic agenda, it appears that reality is making
the group focus on international issues early on.
In response to the funding shortages, Hamas has diligently pursued other
options and has used diplomatic means to obtain aid from other nations. Prime
Minister Haniyeh demonstrates Hamas’s resilience, “We will not give in, and
attempts to isolate the government will fail” (Zabriskie 2006b). While Hamas has
been showing great strength and conviction, they also work hard to alleviate the
effects of their choices which are harming the populace. Still, it is difficult to
know how long the Palestinians can continue under the boycott without
something happening, such as riots or government overthrow.
As far as the conditions set forth by the Quartet and Israel are concerned,
Hamas has continued to play the semantics game. Instead of fully recognizing
Israel’s right to exist, Hamas accepts the reality that Israel does exist (Shikaki
2007b). Forcing Hamas to accept the right of Israel seems ridiculous since the
Palestinians would say that they have just as much, if not more, right to exist and
Israel has not recognized their rights. Furthermore, the land that Israel has a
“right” to was the land that the Palestinians lived on prior to the Jewish influx in
the 1940s. Consequently, by recognizing the political reality that Israel does exist,
even if Palestinians do not think it is ethical or right, Hamas is acting incredibly
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rational. For a Palestinian to say that Israel has a right to exist implicitly means
that Israel had a right to expel the Palestinians and has been justified in their
actions (the occupation and subsequent security measures) to protect their right.
Any Palestinian would have a hard time saying that Israel had a right to inflict the
immense pain and suffering that Palestinians have endured. However, admitting
that Israel exists is an entirely different notion. Therefore, Hamas has come to
terms with the fact that Israel is an internationally recognized nation and that it
would be impossible to reverse that fact. Whereas Israel, the more powerful
player, is being overly demanding, especially for an occupier. Israel wants the
charter of Hamas to reflect their recognition of Israel before negotiations can take
place; however, Israel is not recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to
return to their land. That right must wait for negotiations. Thus, it is a double
standard that Hamas must grant concessions before even reaching the negotiating
table.
While Hamas is unwilling to commit to disarmament, it has consistently
cited its willingness to agree to a hudna, or a truce (Shikaki 2007b). This is
definitely a good start and will at least temporarily end the violence and ease the
tensions and stress that could hinder the peace process. Also, if Hamas is not
provoked by Israel, it will have no legitimate reason to break the hudna, which
could remain in place for years, eventually paving the way for a peace agreement.
It seems that if Israel was dedicated to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict,
then they would be willing to accept the hudna to stop the violence.
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Even though Hamas has won the elections and seems to have the support
of roughly half of the Palestinian population, it is imperative that the group
remembers that they do not have a mandate to pursue whatever policies they wish
without heeding the will of the people. Many governments, including some
American presidents, have mistaken victory as a sign of unconditional support.
Generally, this leads to a president or government paying too little attention to its
populace. Therefore, it will be important for Hamas to heed the wishes of the
Palestinians. That being said, it is equally significant to look at what it is
Palestinians are saying. In September, a poll showed that two-thirds of
Palestinians, which included 51% of Hamas supporters, favored a two-state
solution with Israel (Shikaki 2007b). These polls and the wishes of Palestinians
might have something to do with Hamas’s resignation that the two-state solution
could be a feasible option.
Another telling statistic is that 67% of the Palestinian population does not
believe that Hamas should cave in to donor pressure and recognize Israel
(Palestinian Center…2006). While this may seem startling at first, there is more to
the numbers than meets the eye. Most of the same people polled said that they
would support recognition of Israel as a part of a peace agreement or negotiation
that would also create a Palestinian state (Palestinian Center…2006). It seems
only natural that the Palestinians would want their own nation to be recognized as
well. Furthermore, Palestinians have already seen that even when the PLO and
Fatah modified their policies to fit Western desires, the creation of a Palestinian
nation did not follow. Therefore, they do not want to be jumping through
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whatever hoops the West puts up in hopes that one day they will get their own
state in return for playing nice. Realistically, the Palestinians need leverage at the
negotiations and will not have any if they make all of their concessions now.
Overall, it is important to point out that “Hamas has made significant
strides to evolve, which have so far not been internationally acknowledged”
(Nicole Pelham, International Crisis Group, as quoted in Zabriskie 2006b).
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that if Hamas were to drastically change
its ideology or moderate its position too swiftly, it would alienate some of its
constituency and undermine the solidarity of the movement (Shikaki 2007b).

Change for Fatah
The elections exposed many of Fatah’s weaknesses, thus one outcome of
Hamas’s win that seems almost unavoidable is that Fatah will look to make
changes within its organization. When confronted with what to do during its
period of opposition, one Fatah official, Usama al-Farra, stated that the group
should “complete what we should have done before the elections. And that is to
turn Fatah into a modern political party with a leadership trusted by and
accountable to its members” (Usher 2006). Already, some Fatah officials have
begun to propose reforms. Stating that “the priority now is to rebuild Fatah,”
Former PA security chief, Muhammad Dahlan, has already unveiled his vision for
reform based on three points: (1) the resignation of the FCC and FRC (the two
main bodies in charge of implementing Fatah’s policies); (2) the creation of an
interim leadership; and (3) the convening of the Fatah General Conference (FGC)
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to elect new leaders (Usher 2006). Most Fatah members will be on board with
working to make Fatah stronger and more united; however, the challenge will, as
always, be to reach some sort of compromise between the “old” and “young”
guard.

Israeli Unilateralism
Mariana Ottaway from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
explains that “What is going to force them [Hamas] to change their stance is the
fact that if they don’t participate in the negotiation process, the Israelis are going
to make all the decisions…” (Robinson 2006). Evidence of Israel acting
unilaterally existed before the elections, but now that Hamas is in power, it is
likely that Israel will pursue unilateralism more forcefully. In the Israeli
government’s view, Hamas is not a viable peace partner, forcing Israel to act on
its own. Prime Minister Olmert has stated that Israel will make the final
determination of its borders by 2010 (Usher 2006). Clearly, this statement
indicates that Israel is not only prepared to act of its own accord and to make
decisions on its own, but would actually prefer to do so. In the past, the Israeli
government has used the same method in its relations with President Abbas. Even
as the Israeli government talks about the road map or other negotiations, it still
pursues whatever actions it deems necessary.
Still, Hamas should not give Israel an excuse for acting unilaterally. The
Israeli barrier continues to be constructed despite international and national court
decisions striking it down. While unilateralism is generally seen as a bad foreign
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policy option, it is particularly worrisome in the conflict between Israel and
Palestine. If the Hamas government is not included and viewed as failing to make
progress, Hamas may revert back to its violent tactics. However, assuming that
Hamas does not move to violence again, another group such as Islamic Jihad
might take up arms just as Hamas did when it viewed Fatah as doing nothing
(Usher 2006). Again, it seems counterproductive and against the interest of peace
to work towards the policies that Israel is currently pursuing.

Prospects for Peace
Once Hamas was elected, questions regarding how the election of a
“terrorist” group would affect the peace process were immediately raised.
However, before delving into that question, a brief, recent history of the process
will be given for reference.
One of the major, recent peace agreements was the Oslo Accords signed in
1993 by Yitzhak Rabin and Yassir Arafat. National, regional, and international
changes and the ramifications of these shifts culminated in the agreement by both
leaders to initiate negotiations. Nationally, for Israel, Hamas continued to gain
support and Israel was becoming nervous about the possibility of fighting a
religious battle against Islam (Alkoni 2007). Therefore, Israel was more willing to
negotiate with the secular PLO. Facilitating Arafat’s decision were changes
present within the PLO itself. One of these changes was the second most powerful
member of the PLO, Abu Jehad’s, assassination (Alkoni 2007). Jehad was a more
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conservative leader, and as a result, his assassination strengthened the moderate
position amongst the PLO who promoted negotiations with Israel.
Regionally, the Arab nations started to push for peace again. The boycott
against Egypt ended in the late 1980s, prompting Egypt to prove itself as a leader
in the region once again (Alkoni 2007). Consequently, Egypt started to urge the
two sides to enter into peace talks. Additionally, other Arab nations that had close
ties to the United States also started to promote peace (Alkoni 2007).
Finally, on a global scale, the power balance changed significantly. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was left as the world’s
sole superpower (Alkoni 2007). Since the Soviets had generally supported the
PLO, the collapse hurt the PLO’s standing and also left the only superpower in
support of the other side, Israel (Ibid).
The combination of internal forces and the regional and global pressures
persuaded the leaders of the PLO and Israel to come together in negotiations.
Finally, the idea of “land for peace” was reached, meaning that Israel would
withdraw from the occupied territories while Palestinians would abandon the use
of violence against Israel (Alkoni 2007). As history has shown, the hope
emanating from the Oslo Accords quickly faded into frustration and failure.
The next major peace attempt was made in 2000 at Camp David. This
time, the PLO came into the talks with a set of five goals that they wanted to
reach. The first, naturally, was the creation of an independent state of Palestine
within the 1967 borders (Alkoni 2007). The next goal extended from the idea of
having a state and called for the Palestinians to be in full control of its borders and
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relevant air and sea space (Ibid). Taking East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine
was the third goal put forth by the Palestinians (Ibid). The fourth goal concerned
the rights of Palestinian refugees. Every refugee was to either be given the chance
to return or should be compensated for the property lost, in accordance with UN
Resolution 194 (Alkoni 2007). Lastly, the PLO called for the release of
Palestinian war prisoners currently being held in Israeli jails (Ibid). Unfortunately,
Camp David failed, and helped to spur the second intifada.
After the second intifada broke out in 2000, little hope for peace remained.
In 2003, the Quartet released the Roadmap to Peace. The Roadmap called for a
three phased peace solution. Phase one would involve ending violence and
normalizing life for the Palestinians, including the removal of settlements
(Performance…2003). The second phase is a transition phase that would create a
Palestinian state, but with provisional borders and the third phase would be
negotiations regarding the status of refugees and permanent borders among other
contentious issues (Ibid). The problem with this plan is that the Palestinians must
give up the only leverage they have in the negotiations, force, and in return are
granted nothing right away. Only if they prove themselves, and do not allow any
“terrorist” attacks to take place, would phase two be initiated. Even in phase two,
the new borders of the Palestinian state are provisional, not guaranteed, and the
contentious issue of right of return for the refugees remains unaddressed until
further negotiations. This plan again was not palatable to the Palestinians because
it did not address the major concerns of borders or refugees. Still, the Quartet
wonders why the Palestinians did not accept the plan. Most of the blame was
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placed on Arafat who was labeled as a warmonger, unwilling to compromise.
However, had Arafat accepted this peace agreement or the one at Camp David in
2000 he would have been viewed by the Palestinian people as completely
illegitimate and a disgrace to his people for not having secured anything of value
for Palestinian national interests.
The second peace proposal that has been put forth recently is the Arab
Peace Initiative. In March 2002, the Arab summit met in Beirut and passed the
initiative calling for the 22 members of the Arab League to “normalize” relations
with Israel (Usher 2006). In return, Israel would agree to completely withdrawing
form the occupied territories and would come to a “just” solution addressing the
Palestinian refugees’ right of return (Ibid). However, Israel rejected the initiative.
The Hamas government, though not in power at the time the initiative was first
proposed, has seemed open to the initiative. Khaled Mishaal, the head of Hamas’s
political department, said that “We do not oppose the Arab position. The
recognition of Israel is perhaps possible in the future were Israel to recognize the
[national] rights of the Palestinian people…” (Usher 2006). While most of the
West, the Quartet, and Israel support the Roadmap, it is clear that the Arab
nations and Palestinians favor the Arab Initiative. Again, the process has been
stalled.
With the death of Yassir Arafat in 2004, some hoped that peace talks
might resume. Arafat was often portrayed in a less than complimentary light, and
took most of the blame for the stalled peace process. Thus, with his death and the
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election of Muhmoud Abbas, a leader that the West seemed to like, hope was
restored. And then came Hamas.
As was discussed in an earlier section examining the election results, the
Palestinians voted Hamas into power because they were voting for change and
with the hope that new leaders would bring long-awaited results and peace.
Unfortunately, the international community did not see it the same way. Labeled
as “terrorists,” the newly-formed government was immediately boycotted. While
Hamas continues to moderate their position, Israel and the international
community continues to be un-impressed. The ironic aspect of the whole event is
that the PLO started with a similar platform as Hamas and has taken decades to
achieve a position in which the West and Israel considered them to be a legitimate
negotiating partner. Therefore, it seems that the election of Hamas could not come
at a better time for Israel. Previously faced with plans to withdraw from Gaza and
with unrest among its citizens, the election of Hamas allows Israel to start the
negotiations all over again from square one: denying negotiations. Furthermore,
Israel has benefited from a time of relative peace and a break in suicide bombings
as Hamas tries to reform its image.
Even with Hamas in power, the Arab nations have been looking to restart
the peace process. In March 2007, a summit of the Arab League was held in Saudi
Arabia and has brought the Arab Initiative into the policy dialogue once again
(Arab…2007). Thus far, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is said to be giving the
plan a “guarded welcome” (Arab…2007). The summit is also expected to form
working groups that would promote the Arab peace plan (Ibid).
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Further compounding the issue of peace is the complexity of the conflict
and the number of aspects that are being disputed. First, the immediate problem
for Palestinians is eliminating the violations and inconveniences of the
checkpoints. Another priority for the Palestinians is lifting the economic boycott.
Even though the resolution of these two problems would be a great relief for the
Palestinians, as well as a huge boost in the quality of their lives, many other
points of contention need to be addressed. However, a large concern is that Israel
will use these more immediate points in order to side-step the underlying, longterm problems.
The main long-term issues that will cause the most debate are the right of
return for refugees and border disputes. The status of the refugees is a huge
dilemma, because granting the right of return causes a major problem for Israel.
The population of Israel is 6,352,117 with 19% of that consisting of non-Jewish
populations (NationMaster). The number of Palestinian refugees, while disputed,
is placed at 4,186,711 by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(Palestinian Refugees…2006). Therefore, the fear for Israel is that if the refugees
are allowed to return, the Jewish population will no longer constitute a majority
(Alkoni 2007). The ramifications of the shift in majority go beyond simple
population make-up because of the nature of a democratic society (Ibid). If the
Palestinian refugees were allowed to return, they would comprise a majority of
the population and consequently, would be able to elect leaders who would
represent their interests, which would likely be in contrast to what the Jewish
population would consider to be in their interests. Thus, the return of the refugees
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would either mean giving up some of the political sway of the Jewish state or
diverging from democracy, a move that would be internationally frowned upon
and would be almost politically unfeasible.
Furthermore, for Zionists and many Jewish people, Israel is supposed to
be the Jewish homeland, implying that the state should be comprised of mainly
Jewish people. Even Israeli Prime Minister Olmert addressed this point when he
spoke at the sixth Herzilya Conference, which is considered the most important
policy-making event in Israel. At the conference, he said, “…there is no doubt
that the most important and dramatic step we face is the determination of
permanent borders of the State of Israel, to ensure the Jewish majority in the
country” (Olmert 2006). Additionally, the Prime Minister also references Zionist
thinker, Zeev Jabotinsky, who states that “The term ‘Jewish nation’ is absolutely
clear: it means a Jewish majority” (Ibid). Undeniably, the influx of Palestinian
refugees would go against these principles.
Finally, border and land issues are obviously a serious point of contention.
Neither Israel nor the Palestinians want to lose land. The main arguments
surrounding land and borders are in regards to Jerusalem, the settlements, and
what land would constitute a Palestinian nation. Palestinians want East Jerusalem
as their capital and the Arab Peace Initiative also calls for East Jerusalem to be the
capital of the new Palestinian nation. However, the Israeli government does not
seem willing to compromise on this point. Prime Minister Olmert insisted that
certain places were of national importance, “first and foremost a united
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Jerusalem…” and that “There can be no Jewish state without the capital of
Jerusalem at its center” (Olmert 2006).
The settlements present a unique problem because of the human rights
violations that take the issue beyond a land dispute. When Israel established
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the settlements were systematically
positioned. Settlements were placed so Israeli settlers would be in control of water
resources. For example, the Dead Sea is completely controlled by the settlements
(Lein 2002). Furthermore, many settlements were placed along the main road,
Road No. 60, in order to prevent Palestinian expansion towards the road and to
prevent the Palestinian towns on one side of the road from connecting with the
town on the opposite side of the road (Ibid). In continuing with the idea of
separating towns, the settlements were also strategically placed so that the
Palestinians did not have large, continuous areas of land under their control, but
rather had a series of small, disconnected pieces of land (Ibid). Therefore, it is not
only necessary to remove the settlements to establish a Palestinian nation, but also
to allow the Palestinian people access to resources and the ability to unite their
population.
Finally, Hamas and other Palestinians have called for the release of
Palestinian prisoners being held in Israel, among the most prominent and
influential of these prisoners being Marwan Barghouti. While the issue of prisoner
release is significant to many Palestinians who have friends and family that would
return home, Barghouti presents an especially appealing case. Some scholars,
such as Shaw Dallal, have suggested that one of the main driving forces for peace
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will be the rise of a Nelson Mandela-esque leader (2007). Barghouti could be this
person, and many hope that he will be. As one of the “young” guard among Fatah,
Barghouti has become well-respected by young and old alike. He was close to
Arafat, but came to criticize the PA and the corruption within Fatah
(Profile…2004). Furthermore, he is a charismatic leader who has mastered both
Hebrew and English (Ibid). Therefore, if Israel is interested in peace, its officials
should release Barghouti and give him the chance to help lead his people.

Can Hamas Govern?
While it is difficult to accurately judge the governing efficacy of Hamas
with the economic boycott in place, the short amount of time that they have been
in power, and the unique circumstances of their rule, some indicators suggest that
Hamas would be an effective governing party given the opportunity. When the
PA was established, education, health, and social welfare were three of the five
main areas that the PA was supposed to administer. However, the effective
programs, and sometimes the only programs, that address these issues are
operated by Hamas. Therefore, Hamas has proven itself as a provider and has the
trust of the people because of their competence in these areas. Thus, Hamas
leaders have experience with working on these projects and know what needs to
be done.
A second factor that shows promise for Hamas is how they have run local
areas since elections in 2004 and 2005. The local administrators have been
receiving praise for their work thus far and have been cooperating and talking to
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the necessary Israeli officials in order to secure needs and services for their towns
(Humanitarian…2006). A Palestinian economist stated that:

The municipalities under Hamas control are well run, and the work
ethic has changed dramatically. Mayors are returning to the people and
addressing their needs. The appearance of towns also is changing. They
are much cleaner and more organized.
-Humanitarian… 2006

Adding to this, European diplomats have also praised Hamas officials saying that,
“They are hardworking;…they are strict with money; they enforce the rule of law;
and they are trying to provide efficient services” (Humanitarian…2006). Finally,
even Israelis have agreed that the Hamas leaders seem to be doing a good job.
One Israeli, who is charged with overseeing the territories, explained that, “…so
far [Hamas] have been running services very well” (Ibid). Intuition and
eyewitness accounts such as these seem to show that Hamas could definitely be
an effective leadership. However, the two areas in which Hamas could be seen as
failing, negotiating peace and creating jobs, are both highly dependent upon the
international community and its willingness to help the Hamas government.
Unfortunately, real aid and partnerships with Hamas are lacking severely.

Conclusion
The West and Israel seem to be reacting to Hamas’s victory based upon an
unfounded fear of an Islamist, “terrorist” group forcing Islamist views on the
Palestinian people and waging terror against Israel. However, Hamas will focus
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on the goals of the people: living free of occupation in their own nation and
reducing the extreme poverty that has afflicted over half of the population.
Additionally, once the election results are analyzed in the context of the socioeconomic traits of Hamas’s voters, the conditions that led to Hamas’s election,
and the dire situation that the Palestinians face, it is not hard to understand why
the Palestinians would vote for Hamas, an alternative political organization
representing change and hope. It has also been shown through polls that the
Palestinians favor peace with Israel and a two-state solution; therefore, the fears
that Hamas’s victory signifies the Palestinians’ desire to eliminate Israel can be
laid to rest. The election results were also incredibly democratic and witnessed
higher turnouts than have ever been recorded in American history. Instead of
boycotting the election results, the US should be praising the democratic nature of
the Palestinian people and should respect the choice made through democratic
processes.
As for concerns about Hamas being an Islamist group, other nations have
also dealt with Islamist groups joining the government and have experienced
successful integration. Most groups, religious or otherwise, moderate their
positions once in government in order to appeal to a wider spectrum of voters,
subsequently increasing their influence and hopefully gaining more power within
the government. Furthermore, for decades European nations have had political
parties based on religion. Therefore, the issue of having a non-secular party, while
perhaps unfamiliar to Americans, should not be reason to challenge or boycott the
Palestinian government.
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A hurdle that must be overcome in order for the peace process to continue
is the compulsion to react to any terrorist with isolation. Since the 1960s, the
Israeli government has been capitalizing on terrorist acts carried out by the
Palestinians. Instead of dealing with the militant attacks of the PLO as acts of
terrorism, the Israeli government used the attacks to characterize the entire
Palestinian nationalism movement as “terrorist,” de-legitimizing the movement.
At the same time, international and national attention was focused on terrorism
and deflected from the real concerns of the Palestinian people and the conditions
that led the Palestinians to utilize such desperate tactics (Lockman 2004).
Consequently, Israel relies on the idea that it does not have to address the
concerns of the Palestinians because they are “terrorists” or because security must
take priority. However, despite the tactics being pursued by a government, the
real problems and the plight of millions of people should not be overshadowed or
ignored, as the Israeli government seems to have masterfully accomplished.
The same public relations approach used in the 1960s against the PLO is
now being employed against Hamas. Under this approach, Israel claims that it
does not have to negotiate with the Palestinians because they have a “terrorist”
government. Furthermore, after September 11th, the US is even more willing to
dismiss “terrorists” than they were before. The Israeli government realized the
vulnerabilities that September 11th unearthed for the US and has exploited them to
avoid negotiating peace with the Palestinians. In his address to the sixth Herzliya
Conference, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that one of the positive
aspects of Israel’s defense strategy is that, since September 11th, Israel has “the
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legitimacy to fight terror that we didn’t have 4-5 years ago” (Mofaz 2006). While
demonizing Hamas and the Palestinians, Israelis portray themselves as the
innocent victims trying to fight terrorism.
What is often overlooked or lost in the exaggerated rhetoric revolving
around terrorism is that sometimes terrorist acts are just tactics, not inherent
cultural differences or a manifestation of hatred. Committing a terrorist act should
not permanently label an organization as unreasonable or barbaric. Sometimes, as
is the case for Palestinians, the use of terrorism is a result of not having an
efficient or equivalent means to fight back against a “militarily superior enemy”
(Lockman 2004). Palestinians do not have the tanks or military power to fight
Israel in conventional terms, and have turned to terrorism as a last resort.
Terrorism for Hamas is just a tactic; it may be “morally questionable” (Lockman
2004), but it is effective. Furthermore, there seems to be a frequently overlooked
double standard in using the characterization of “terrorism.” Hamas is interpreted
as committing a terrorist attack when a suicide bomber blows himself up at a
military checkpoint; while when an Israeli F-16 bombs a village, demolishing
entire apartment complexes, the strike is legitimized as a necessary means of
defense. The unwillingness of many Western countries to compare the use of
tactics on both sides, in terms of their relative capabilities, has been
counterproductive to stabilizing relations and negotiating peace in the region.
However, now that Hamas has a political outlet to fight Israel with, their tactics
can be changed. Hamas has acknowledged this and has voiced that it would be
receptive to a truce.
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In the current “war on terror,” rhetoric portrays the situation as though
peace through negotiation is not an option and that terrorists are determined to
destroy their enemies, usually the West and Western ideals. However, Lockman
notes that many groups in the past have committed terrorist acts and have gone on
to find peace. The Jewish people themselves once committed terrorist attacks
against the British. Among these terrorists were two future Israeli Prime
Ministers, Menahem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, both of whom were wanted by
the British for their role in a paramilitary group responsible for murdering British
soldiers, kidnappings, and bombings. Furthermore, the African National Congress
(ANC) led by Nelson Mandela in South Africa was listed on the US government’s
terrorist list (Lockman 2004). Despite this listing, the white, apartheid
government decided to negotiate with the ANC and peace was reached in South
Africa.
Regarding Hamas, the international community, particularly the US and
Israel, should not be so intent upon isolating them because they are a “terrorist”
organization. The circumstances and otherwise helplessness of the Palestinian
people led Hamas to engage in extreme tactics. It is crucial that more policy
makers realize that Hamas, and the voters who backed Hamas, are not barbaric
people lacking morals, but a frustrated and desperate people losing hope after
decades of occupation and oppression. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
assume that now that Hamas has a conventional way to voice their concerns, they
will abandon their terrorist tactics. Still, if Israel continues to worry about the use
of violence, “the threat in that situation ought to be to halt aid if it [Hamas]
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engages in violence rather than if it engages in politics” (Humanitarian…2006).
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, drawing upon historical precedents,
the reaction by some members of the international community to reject Hamas as
a partner for peace is unfounded and irrational. Whether Israel and the US
approve or not, Hamas is the legitimate, democratically elected representation of
the Palestinian people.
Also, Hamas has become too popular and influential to be ignored or
circumvented (Dajani 2006). That being said, Hamas can be the only partner for
peace with Israel. Therefore, a more constructive policy for the international
community to adopt would be to engage Hamas in negotiations. Some nations,
such as France and Russia, have voiced opinions along these lines and an official
from Brussels stated that, “ultimately it is nonsensical not to engage with Hamas”
(Humanitarian…2006). Once these processes are set in motion, then the issues of
disarmament and the recognition of Israel can be addressed, along with the
equally legitimate interests of the Palestinian people to have their own nation,
among other concerns.
Another reason that should compel the international community to push
for negotiations with Hamas is that the current situation exacerbated by Israel’s
unilateral actions is creating a system of apartheid with grave humanitarian
concerns and is plaguing the peace process. Building physical barriers and further
humiliating and dehumanizing the Palestinians is not going to bring about peace.
As President Abbas stated, “…checkpoints, arbitrary killings, the separation wall,
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and arrests will only lead to hatred, despair, and continued conflict”
(Abbas…2006).
Furthermore, Israel continues to make a mockery of international law and
institutions by ignoring various rulings and resolutions to destroy the barrier and
to remove all settlements. Israel even manages to disrespect and abuse its
relations with the US. Former Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, was quoted
as saying, “Our American friends offer us money, arms, and advice. We take the
money, we take the arms, and we decline the advice” (Shlaim 2004). As Dayan
demonstrates, the Israelis are fully aware of the US’s unwavering support for
Israel and feel comfortable enough in the relationship with the US to snub the
advice of the US government. Evidently, the US is less willing to restrict aid to
Israel, even in the face of direct abuse of the relationship between the two nations.
Overall, the main obstacle to peace is not that Hamas is a “terrorist” group
or even that Israel is building a barrier, but that America gives unconditional,
unwavering support to Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US
became, and has remained, the only superpower. With that distinction, America
has a unique role in world affairs and an ability to sway decisions by pressuring
other countries directly, or through indirect channels, such as when other nations
do not take the actions they want for fear of repercussions from the US or
upsetting their relationship with the US.
Not only does the US’s constant and unequivocal support for Israel
undermine the peace process, but it also tarnishes the US’s credibility as a peace
broker. Even if the US has good intentions, some of the ideas and policies that US
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officials express are ludicrous. Secretary Rice hails Prime Minister Olmert and
President Abbas for agreeing to hold talks every two weeks as a sign of progress
towards peace (Arab…2007); however, Hamas is omitted from these talks.
Negotiations without Hamas will never work, so the talks themselves seem
worthless.
Additionally, Secretary Rice is pushing Arab nations to recognize Israel
before talks commence as an incentive for Israel to participate (Adler…2007).
Israel should not need more of an incentive to negotiate than the possibility of
peace, but if Israel needs persuading, it should come in the form of pressure from
the international community, not concessions from the Arab world. If the
Palestinians gave up the use of force and then recognized Israel before
negotiations even started, the Palestinians would have nothing left to bargain
with. Furthermore, many Palestinians rightly question why there is so little
pressure on Israel and so much pressure on them to reform and provide tokens of
their goodwill. With the US’s approach to the peace talks, one would assume that
the Palestinians were the occupiers. Therefore, the attitudes of US officials alter
the way people in the Middle East view American foreign policy. Thus, the US
should re-think its policies and focus on re-building its reputation as an honest
broker for peace, and, more importantly, as an unbiased supporter of equality and
human rights.
Assuming that the US decides to pressure Israel into peace negotiations,
some people may doubt if there is a viable partner for peace. I believe that given a
chance, Hamas could be that partner. Hamas has shown effective leadership in
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governance and in social programs. Furthermore, Hamas has the ability to
organize and bring the Palestinian people together, as was witnessed by their
remarkable ability to campaign for national elections. Hamas has the trust of the
people and a reputation of being free from corruption and for being ideologically
strong enough to defend the rights of the Palestinians without succumbing to
unfair Western demands. While it is undeniable that there are hard-line members
of Hamas, who wish for the destruction of Israel, there are also members of the
Israeli government, including the Likud party, who wish for the same fate for
Palestinians. Even so, it is imprudent to ignore the voices of more moderate
leaders, including Prime Minister Haniyeh. Conversely, the international
community should support the moderate leaders on both sides. Also, if the US and
Israel were willing to commence well-intended peace negotiations, and are
prepared to address Palestinian concerns, Hamas will have to listen to the will of
the Palestinian majority, who wants peace.
Even though the US and Israel must change their stance towards Hamas
and the peace process in general, Hamas could also take actions to foster an
atmosphere that is conducive to peace. One effort that Hamas should make is to
present a unified position on some of the issues. Hamas leaders have varying
stances on the main points of contention between Israelis and Palestinians,
making it easy for Israel and the US to present Hamas’s hard-liners’ opinions as
the platform for the whole party, marginalizing, if not completely masking, the
views of more moderate members of Hamas. Thus, Prime Minister Haniyeh and
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the Hamas party as a whole need to have a coherent strategy. Furthermore, In
order to present their strategy, Hamas must use the media more effectively.
Overall, the implications of Hamas’s victory have been severe and hardhitting for the Palestinians. Having a “terrorist”-led government has caused the
Palestinians to lose aid and has given Israel another reason to stall on peace and to
further their system of apartheid under the guise of security and fighting
terrorism. Nevertheless, the outcome of the election could have been different if
the international community had reacted more reasonably to Hamas’s victory.
Inclusion of Hamas is the only way for the peace process to work, because if
Israeli and Palestinian leaders are not communicating, then nothing can be solved.
Being engaged by the international community, I believe, would cause Hamas to
moderate their policies as a reflection of the will of the Palestinian people,
coupled with a genuine and real concession on the part of Israel. Furthermore,
now that Hamas and Fatah are cooperating and have formed a unity government,
there is even more reason to hope that the two groups will work together to
improve governance and strengthen Palestinian institutions. Also, Hamas has
proven extremely effective in administering social programs and could translate
these skills to the creation of national programs. To expect the Hamas leadership,
or any Palestinian leadership, to make countless concessions as they fight for only
10-20% of all land that used to be theirs, while the Israeli leadership takes steps in
the other direction and continues their land grab through settlements and barriers,
is outrageous. Unfortunately, the Israeli government has no reason to stop these
policies. Although many members of the international community, the UN, and
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NGOs have voiced their disapproval of Israeli policies, these nations and
organizations do not have the strength or will to confront Israel because of its ties
to the US. Therefore, it is my opinion that peace and justice will not come to the
Palestinian or Israeli people until the US government changes its attitude towards
Israel or until international outcry becomes too strong to ignore.
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Appendix A: Map of Settlements and the Barrier in the West Bank

Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace
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Appendix B: Chronology of Events Surrounding the Conflict between Israel
and Palestine During the Span of Hamas’s Existence
1987
The first intifada breaks out.
Hamas is founded by Sheik Yassin, as an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.
1988
December 14: Arafat recognizes Israel (Al-Aqsa 2004).
1992
December 17: Israel deports 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, leading to
Palestinian unity and support for Hamas (Mishal 96:2000).
1993
September 13: Oslo Accords, end of the first intifada (Usher 2006).
1994
July 1: Arafat’s 27 year exile ends.
Establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Usher 2006).
2000
September 28: Ariel Sharon visits Temple Mount, inciting a string of violence
and sparking the start of the second intifada (Al-Aqsa 2004).
September 30: A 12-year-old boy is shot during a gunbattle in Gaza, increasing
Palestinians anger about the mounting numbers of children killed by
Israeli forces (Al-Aqsa 2004).
October 17: President Clinton brokers the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement, which
fails right away (Al-Aqsa 2004).
2001
February 6: Ariel Sharon is elected prime minister of Israel (Al-Aqsa 2004).
May 18: F-16 warplanes are launched against Gaza (Al-Aqsa 2004).
June 1: Islamic Jihad carries out a suicide bomb attack in a disco in Tel Aviv,
killing 21 people (Al-Aqsa 2004).
August 9: Suicide bomb in a restaurant kills 15 and injures 90 (Al-Aqsa 2004).
August 27: Palestinian leader Abu Ali Mustafa is assassinated by Israel in a
missile strike (Al-Aqsa 2004).
October 17: The tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi, for Israel is assassinated
(Al-Aqsa 2004).
December 2: Suicide bomber on a bus in Haifa kills 15 and injures 100 (AlAqsa 2004).
2002
March 8: 45 people are killed, mainly Palestinians (Al-Aqsa 2004).
March 27: Suicide bomber kills 28 at a hotel during Passover. Hamas takes
responsibility for the act (Al-Aqsa 2004).
April: Fighting in Jenin and Nablus.
May 7: Suicide bomber attacks a club killing 16, also claimed by Hamas (AlAqsa 2004).
June 16: Israel begins construction of the “barrier (Al-Aqsa 2004).”
June 18: Suicide bomber kills 19 on a bus in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa 2004).
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July 22: Hamas’s military commander Salah Shehada is killed in a bombing by
Israel (Al-Aqsa 2004).
2003
January 5: Suicide bombers kill 23 in the streets of Tel Aviv (Al-Aqsa 2004).
March 19: Mahmoud Abbas becomes the first Palestinian prime minister (AlAqsa 2004).
April 30: The Quartet (the EU, UN, Russia, and the US) unveil the roadmap
peace plan which calls for the creation of an independent Palestinian
state…nobody sticks to the timetable (Al-Aqsa 2004).
June 10: Israel attempts to assassinate Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in an
air strike (Al-Aqsa 2004).
June 11: In retaliation, suicide bombers kill 16 on a bus in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa
2004).
June 27: Militants agree with the Palestinian Authority to a “hudna” or ceasefire which will stop attacks on Israel (Al-Aqsa 2004).
August 20: Suicide bomber kills 20 on a bus in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa 2004).
October 4: Suicide bomber kills 19 at a restaurant in Haifa (Al-Aqsa 2004).
October 13: The Geneva Accords, brokered by both Israelis and Palestinians, is
revealed. It is rejected by Israel and Palestinian militants (Al-Aqsa 2004).
2004
January 29: Suicide bomber kills 10 on a bus in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa 2004).
February 2: Sharon calls for a plan to remove Israeli settlements in Gaza (AlAqsa 2004).
March 22: Hamas’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, is assassinated in an
air strike by Israel (Al-Aqsa 2004).
May 13: Israel moves into the Rafah refugee camp and kills 40 Palestinians (AlAqsa 2004.
May 17: Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi is assassinated by Israel in a
missile strike (Al-Aqsa 2004).
July 9: Israel’s barrier is ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice (AlAqsa 2004).
August 31: Suicide bombers kill 16 on two buses (Al-Aqsa 2004).
October 27: A plan to withdraw Israeli settlers from Gaza is voted on in the
Israeli legislature (Al-Aqsa 2004).
November 11: Yasser Arafat dies in France. Mahmoud Abbas is elected head of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Al-Aqsa 2004).
2005
January 15: Mahmoud Abbas is elected president of the Palestinian Authority.
He pushes for a ceasefire during his inauguration speech (Al-Aqsa 2004).
January 21: Palestinian Authority police try to stop militant rockets from being
launched into Israel by militants (Al-Aqsa 2004).
January: President Abbas calls for the convening of the FGC (Usher 2006).
February 8: Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon meet in Sharm al-Sheikh and
agree to a truce (Al-Aqsa 2004).
February 10: Hamas fires rockets into an Israeli settlement, saying it will not be
bound by the ceasefire (Al-Aqsa 2004).
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March 15: Signing of the Cairo Declaration between Fatah and Hamas that will
call for new elections in which Hamas will participate in (Usher 2006).
August 22: Israel completes Gaza withdrawal.
2006
January 4: Sharon goes into a coma after a stroke.
January 25: Hamas wins national elections, taking 72 of 132 seats in parliament
(Usher 2006).
January 30: The Quartet (the US, EU, UN, and Russia) meets in London to
discuss relations with the PA (Usher 2006).
February 18: New Palestinian parliament is sworn in in Gaza and Ramallah
(Usher 2006).
February 19: Israel’s policy towards the Hamas-led government of isolating
and withholding funds is announced (Usher 2006).
March 31: Clashes in Gaza Strip between rival militants leave 36 wounded and
after the assassination of a top commander (Hamas…2006).
September: Government workers, backed by Fatah go on strike due to Hamas’s
failure to pay their wages (Shikaki 2007b).
September: Israel unilaterally pulls out of Gaza (Shikaki 2007b).
December: Qatar agrees to pay the desperately needed teachers’ wages
(Qatar…2006).
2007
January: A Committee of British MPs releases a report voicing their opinion
that the UK should enter into dialogue with Hamas (UK Warning…2007).
February 8: President Abbas and Khaled Meshaal sign the Mecca Declaration
in Saudi Arabia, forming a unity government (Palestinian Rivals…2007).
March: Arab League relaunches Arab Peace Initiative (Arab…2007).
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Appendix C: 2006 Election Results

Proportional Representation List (66 Seats)

0%
0%
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Change and Reform List
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Fatah
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Source: Data from the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre
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Distribution of Constituent Seats in the Gaza Strip
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Appendix D: 2006 Election Results – The Elected Officials
Palestinian Legislative Council, according to the Central Elections Commission
The Proportional Representation List (The Homeland List) (66 seats):
The Change and Reform List (Hamas):
1- Ismail Abdul Salam Haniyye
2- Mohammed Abu Teir
3- Jamileh Abdullah al-Shanti
4- Mohammed Jamal Nu'man Alaeddin
5- Yasser Daoud Mansour
6- Khalil Musa Rabai
7- Huda Naim al-Qreinawi
8- Mahmoud Ahmad al-Ramahi
9- Mahmoud Khaled Zahhar
10- Abdul Fattah Hasan Dukhan
11- Ibrahim Mohammed Dahbour
12- Mariam Mahmoud Saleh
13- Fathi Mohammed Qar'awi
14- Anwar Mohammed Zboun
15- Imad Mahmoud Nofal
16- Omar Mahmoud Matar
17- Muna Salim Saleh Mansour
18- Yahia Abdul Aziz al-Abadsah
19- Mohammed Maher Yousef Bader
20- Ayman Hussein Daraghmeh
21- Fathi Ahmad Hammad
22- Mariam Mohammed Farhat
23- Sayyed Salem Abu Msameh
24- Marwan Mohammed Abu Ras
25- Samira Abdullah Halayqah
26- Jamal Ismail Iskeik
27- Ali Salim Roumanin
28- Ahmad Yousef Abu Halabiyye
29- Abdul Jaber Mustafa Fuqaha'
30- Younes Mohammed Abu Daqqah
Fatah List:
31- Marwan Barghouthi
32- Mohammed Abu Yatta
33- Intisar al-Wazir
34- Nabil Shaath
35- Hakam Balawi
36- Abdullah Abdullah
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37- Najat Abu Baker
38- Rajai Barakeh
39- Ibrahim al-Musaddar
40- Rabihah Thiab
41- Mohammed al-Lahham
42- Jamal Abul Rob
43- Sahar al-Qawasmi
44- Majed Abu Shammaleh
45- Faisal Abu Shahla 46- Issa Qaraqe'
47- Siham Thabet
48- Naser Jumaa
49- Alaeddin Yaghi
50- Abdul Rahim Barham
51- Jamal Abdul Hamid al-Haj
52- Najat al-Astal
53- Jihad Tmeileh
54- Jihad Abu Zneid
55- Akram al-Haymouni
56- Jamal Huweil
57- Naimah al-Sheikh Ali
Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa List (PFLP)
58- Ahmad Sa'dat
59- Jamil Majdalawi
60- Khaledah Jarrar
Third Way List
61- Salam Fayyad
62- Hanan Ashrawi
Alternative List (DFLP, PPP, Fida and Independent figures)
63- Qays Abdul Karim
64- Bassam al-Salhi
Independent Palestine List
65- Mustafa Barghouthi
66- Rawia al-Shawwa
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The Constituencies (66 seats):
WEST BANK:
Jerusalem
67- Ibrahim Abu Salem (Hamas)
68- Mohammed Totah (Hamas)
69- Wael Abdul Rahman (Hamas)
70- Ahmad Attoun (Hamas)
71- Bernard Sabella (Fatah)
72- Emil Jarjoui (Fatah)
Hebron
73- Nayef Rjoub (Hamas)
74- Aziz Dweik (Hamas)
75- Mohammed Abu Jheisheh (Hamas)
76- Nizar Ramadan (Hamas)
77- Samir al-Qadi (Hamas)
78- Azzam Salhab (Hamas)
79- Basem Za'arir (Hamas)
80- Hatem Qfeisheh (Hamas)
81- Mohammed al-Tal (Hamas)
Bethlehem
82- Khaled Thweib (Hamas)
83- Mahmoud al-Khatib (Hamas)
84- Fayez Saqqa (Fatah)
85- Fouad Kokali (Fatah)
Jenin
86- Khaled Abed Yahia (Hamas)
87- Khaled Abu Hasan (Hamas)
88- Shami Shami (Fatah)
89- Azzam al-Ahmad (Fatah)
Ramallah
90- Muhib Abdullah (Fatah)
91- Hasan Yousef (Hamas)
92- Ahmad Mubarak (Hamas)
93- Fadel Hamdan (Hamas)
94- Mahmoud Misleh (Hamas)
Nablus
95- Hamed al-Beitawi (Hamas)
96- Ahmad Ali Ahmad (Hamas)
97- Riyad Ali Amli (Hamas)
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98- Hosni Mohammed Ahmad Yasin (Hamas)
99- Daoud Abu Seir (Hamas)
100- Mahmoud al-Aloul (Fatah)
Tulkarem
101- Abdul Rahman Fahmi Zeidan (Hamas)
102- Hasan Khreisheh (Independent)
103- Riyad Raddad (Hamas)
Qalqilia
104- Walid Assaf (Fatah)
105- Ahmad Hazza' Shreim (Fatah)
Jericho
106- Saeb Erekat (Fatah)
Salfit
107- Naser Abdul Jawad (Hamas)
Toubas
108- Khaled Abu Tos (Hamas)
GAZA STRIP
Khan Yunis
109- Younes al-Astal (Hamas)
110- Salah al-Bardawil (Hamas)
111- Khamis Najjar (Hamas)
112- Suleiman al-Farra (Hamas)
113- Mohammed Dahlan (Fatah)
Der al-Balah
114- Abdul Rahman al-Jamal (Hamas)
115- Salem Salameh (Hamas)
116- Ahmad Abu Holi (Fatah)
Rafah
117- Mohammed Hijazi (Fatah)
118- Radwan al-Akhras (Fatah)
119- Ashraf Jumaa (Fatah)
Northern Gaza
120- Yousef al-Sharafi (Hamas)
121- Atef Udwan (Hamas)
122- Ismail al-Ashqar (Hamas)
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123- Mohammed Shihab (Hamas)
124- Mushir al-Habal (Hamas)
Gaza
125- Ziad Abu Amro (Independent)
126- Saeed Siam (Hamas)
127- Ahmad Bahar (Hamas)
128- Khalil al-Hayyeh (Hamas)
129- Mohammed al-Ghoul (Hamas)
130- Jamal Saleh (Hamas)
131- Hussam al-Tawil (Independent)
132- Jamal al-Khudari (Independent)

Source: Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre
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Appendix E: Brief Profiles of Hamas’s Leaders
Sheik Ahmad Yassin – Founder of Hamas (Mishal 37:2000) Arrested by Israel in
1989 after the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli soldier (Mishal 58:2000).
Freed from jail as part of an exchange for agents responsible for the assassination
attempt on Khaled Mishaal (Profile…2006). Assassinated by Israeli missile attack
on March 22, 2004 (Who…2007).
Abd al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi – Most prominent leader in the occupied territories
(Mishal 96: 2000). Assassinated by Israel on April 17, 2004 (Who…2007).
Ismail Haniyeh – Prime Minister. Considered to be more moderate.
Musa Abu Marzuq – Head of Hamas’s political bureau (Mishal 67: 2000). Part of
outside leadership, located in the US (Mishal 88:2000). Arrested in 1995 by the
United States (Mishal 162: 2000).
Mahmoud Al-Zahar – Generally considered more hard-line (Shikaki 2007b).
Former surgeon. Minister of foreign affairs (Shikaki 2007b). Helped found Hamas
and served as its main spokesman (Robinson 2006). Many believe that he will be
a crucial tie to the traditional power base in Gaza (Robinson 2006).
Khaled Mishaal – Generally considered more hard-line (Shikaki 2007b). Hamas
spokesman. Exiled in Syria (Robinson 2006). Head of Hamas’s political
department (Usher 2006). Survived an assassination attempt by Israel due to
Jordan’s intervention (Profile…2006).
Walid Aql – Founder and first commander of battalions of ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam,
Hamas’s military apparatus (Mishal 64: 2000)
Ibrahim Ghawsha- Hamas spokesman in Amman (Mshal 163: 2000).
Muhammad Nazzal – Representative in Jordan (Mushal 162: 2000)
Abdul Khaliq al-Natche – Considered to be more moderate. Signed the Prisoner’s
Document for Hamas (Shikaki 2007b).
Sheik Mohammed Abu Tir – Military commander. “We are not against the Jews.
We are against occupation and oppression (Robinson 2006).” “There are facts on
the ground that we cannot close our eyes to. We are not going to tear up all the
agreements (Robinson 2006)” Shows that some leaders are willing to take more
moderate approaches and would perhaps consider negotiating with Israel.
Sheik Hassan Yussef – Religious figure and political boss in the West Bank
(Robinson 2006).
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Mohammed Deif – Military commander. Injured in an air strike in 2002, Dief
probably does not run operations anymore, but is an important symbolic
figure (Robinson 2006).
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Appendix F: Roadmap to Peace
Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
April 30, 2003 US Department of State
The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear
phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through
reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic,
humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet
[the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination
is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005,
as presented in President Bush’s speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU,
Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial
statements.
A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a
leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a
practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel’s
readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be
established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a
negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate
implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions
between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for
implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and
depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each
of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations
rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated
in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.
A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an
independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace
and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the
Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on
the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace,
UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and
the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab
League Summit – calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace
and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital
element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks,
including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.
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The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties'
performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are
expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.
Phase I: Ending Terror And Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building
Palestinian Institutions -- Present to May 2003
In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of
violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be
accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and
Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end
violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian
security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in
preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free,
fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary
steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas
occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that
existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also
freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.
At the outset of Phase I:
•

•

Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s
right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and
unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence
against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end
incitement against Israel.
Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment
to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian
state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by
President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against
Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement
against Palestinians.

Security
•

•

Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and
undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain
individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis
anywhere.
Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins
sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those
engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and
infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons
and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and
corruption.
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•

•

•

•
•

•

GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on
civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and
property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction;
destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other
measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet
representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on
establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and
resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight
board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a
lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
o All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three
services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
o Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF
counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other
undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including
regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S.
security officials.
Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of
support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these
funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury
Account.
As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws
progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two
sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000.
Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian Institution-Building
•

•
•

•

Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for
Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee
circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary
democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public
comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for
submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian
institutions.
Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered
executive authority/decision-making body.
GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet
sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other
reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform
efforts.
Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake
fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine
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•
•

•

•

•

separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms
for this purpose.
Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC
reviews and revises election law.
Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic
benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian
Reform.
As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the
context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral
campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free,
open, and fair elections.
GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters,
movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved
in the election process.
GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed
Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that
these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements
between the parties.

Humanitarian Response
•

•

•

Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and
Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to
improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions
on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered
access of international and humanitarian personnel.
AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic
development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor
assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds,
including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring
mechanism.

Civil Society
•

Continued donor support, including increased funding through
PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development
and civil society initiatives.

Settlements
•
•

GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March
2001.
Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity
(including natural growth of settlements).
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Phase II: Transition -- June 2003-December 2003
In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on
the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has
been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a
leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing
democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil
institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of
the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an
independent, viable, state.
Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet
of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance
of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives
and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and
ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional
borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security
performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of
Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the
goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution,
formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform,
and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
•

•

•
•
•

International Conference: Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with
the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian
elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process,
leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with
provisional borders.
o Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a
comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and
Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles
described in the preamble to this document.
o Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
o Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional
water resources, environment, economic development, refugees,
and arms control issues.
New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized
and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if
required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally
established, consistent with draft constitution.
Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective
security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders
through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the
international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior
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•
•

agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further
action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian
state with provisional borders.
Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active,
sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state,
including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
-- 2004 – 2005
Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into
account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are
consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained,
effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.
•

•
•
•

•

•

Second International Conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation
with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an
independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to
launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the
Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including
on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress
toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and
Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid
out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.
Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained,
effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian
institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status
agreement.
Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that
ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement
negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that
ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair,
and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on
the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious
concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews,
Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states,
Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living
side-by-side in peace and security.
Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for
all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace.
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Appendix G: The Arab Peace Initiative
The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th
Ordinary Session,
•

•

•

Reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary
Arab summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the
strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with
international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment
on the part of the Israeli government.
Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince
Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in which his highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli
withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed
by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and
Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East
Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations
in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.
Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military
solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the
parties, the council:

1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its
strategic option as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:
a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967,
including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the
remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.
b. Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be
agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.
c. The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent
Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967
in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:
a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement
with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.
b. Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive
peace.

113
4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with
the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in
order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood,
enabling the Arab Countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness
and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.
6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to
support this initiative.
7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of
some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of
Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at
all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the security council, the United
States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European
Union.
Source: http://www.jordanembassyus.org/arab_initiative.htm
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Appendix H: Glossary of Relevant Terms

Palestinian Authority (PA): Formed in 1994 (Usher 2006), the PA is the
government of Palestine. First created in the Oslo Accords, the PA was to
address issues such as health, social welfare, education, direct taxation and
tourism. The members of the PA are elected by the Palestinian people
(Bennett et al 2003).
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO): Formed in 1964 during the first
Arab summit, which convened in regards to tensions about diverting water
supplies (The Middle East 2005). The PLO is a nationalist group that
became the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people
(Lockman 2004). The group consists of Fatah, the most prominent group
in the organization, as well as other Palestinian groups (Ibid).
Oslo Accords: Signed in Washington DC on September 13, 1993, the Oslo
Accords ended the first intifada. The Israeli government was to start
pulling out its settlements. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was also
created with this document (Bennett et al 2003).
Camp David Summit: 2000. Failed peace negotiations between Arafat and
Rabin. One of the impetus’s for the Al Aqsa Intifada.
Road Map: A plan outlined in 2003 to reach peace between Israel in Palestine,
which was developed by the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and Russia). Focuses
on four goals: “(1) Regaining PA control of the street and asserting its
monopoly of force; (2) reforming and strengthening public institutions and
opening the political system to greater and more inclusive participation;
(3) reducing or eliminating violence directed at Israelis; and (4) returning
to negotiations with Israel, with the goal of implementing the Road Map
and entering permanent status talks (Shikaki 2007b)”
Arab Peace Initiative: Launched in Beirut by the Arab League and subsequently
relaunched in 2007. Arab nations agree to normalize relations with Israel,
in return for the immediate resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict:
permanent borders for Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital,
withdrawal from all settlements, and a just solution to the refugee
problem.
First Intifada: Started in 1987. Ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo
Accords.
Second Intifada (Al Aqsa Intifada): Started in 2000 due to frustration with the
failed Camp David Summit and Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount.
Characterized by increased violence on both sides.

